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THE RACE, CLASS AND HOUSING CONUNDRUM: A
RATIONALE AND PROPOSAL FOR A LEGISLATIVE
POLICY OF SUBURBAN INCLUSION
CHARLES E. DAYE*

[The Federal Government] will carry out . . .programs in a way

that will be as helpful as possible to communities which are receptive to
the expansion of housing opportunities for all of our people.
[T]he infinitely varied individual questions that arise as
thousands of local governments hammer out their individual local land
use policies are not appropriate for Federal determination ...neither
would it be wise to allow a situation to develop in which [local land use
policies] have to be hammered out in the courts.'
I.

A

MAGNITUDES AND TRENDS:

CONUNDRUM REVEALED

2

A. A DisappearingDeferred Dream

For decades disadvantaged Americans, black and white, abandoned
rural areas and underdeveloped regions of the nation. Impelled by a
* Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
N.C.; B.A., North Carolina Central University (1966); J.D. Columbia University (1969).
A special word of thanks is expressed to Ms. Sue Mason and Ms. Kathy Gleason, both third
year law students at the School of Law, University of North Carolina, who served very ably as
research assistants to me during the prepartion of this article.
1. Nixon, Federal Housing Policies Relative to Equal Opportunity, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PREs. Doc. 892, 901 and 904 (June 14, 1971). This statement is perhaps a classic example of the
contradictions one encounters in the traditional explication of national housing policies. This
article examines the contradictions and questions the basic assumptions that underlie America's
housing policies.
2. This subtopic is inspired by Langston Hughes' famous poem entitled "Harlem." The
poignance of the topic may be increased by quoting the poem:
"What happens to a dream deferred?
Does it dry up
like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like a sore-And then run?
Does it stink like rotten meat?
Or crust and sugar overLike a syrupy sweet?
Maybe it just sags
Like a heavy load.
Or does itexplode?'
Reprinted from Hughes, SELECTED POEMS 268 (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1959).
The inspiration of the poem is not unique to the author. After the inspiration occurred, I occa-
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dream of improving their circumstances, and drawn by a vision of opportunities in cities, poor Americans, black and white, "invaded ' 3 cities. Like a parched desert traveller's hallucinatory view of a cool oasis
in the distance, in current times the vision of opportunities in America's
cities is fast disappearing. Thus does a dream become a nightmare.
Poor rural people moved in a general migratory pattern largely to
northeastern and midwestern cities.4 In the last two decades, however,
a second vast migration has taken place. Middle and upper income
people, predominantly white, have moved to the suburbs and exurbs,
and, in the process, "abandoned" central cities.5 Businesses and government agencies have left and continue to leave central cities for outer
locations at an accelerated pace. A metropolitan configuration has de-

veloped with increasingly black and poor cities, surrounded by pros-

perous, white suburbs and exurbs.6
Major cities are uttering fiscal cries, perhaps gasps, of distress--caught in a dilemma of shrinking fiscal bases and increased de-

mands for services in a time of escalating costs.7 They are losing jobs
in record numbers in the blue collar and semi-skilled categories to suburbs, exurbs, and the "sunbelt" area of the nation.8 Unemployment is
high generally, is chronic for blacks, and is a disaster for young blacks.9
sioned to come across, S. KAPLAN, THE DREAM DEFERRED: PEOPLE, POLITICS AND PLANNING IN
SUBURBIA, (The Seabury Press, New York, 1976). The same poem apparently inspired Kaplan's
title.
3. This is a harsh sounding term which does not necessarily connote an unfavorable view of
the newcomers, but describes a phenomenon recognized in sociological literature. E.g., R. MORRIS, URBAN SOCIOLOGY, 70, 101-02, 109-12 (Praeger, New York 1968); A. BOSKOFF, THE SOCIOLOGY OF URBAN REGIONS 96 (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York 1970); N. GIST & S. FAVA,
URBAN SOCIETY 107, 155-75, 191-92 (Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York 1964); J. PALEN,
THE URBAN WORLD 75 (McGraw-Hill, New York 1975); R. PARK, HUMAN COMMUNITIES 148-49
(The Free Press, New York 1952).
4. J. HEILBRUN, URBAN ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 184 (St. Martin's Press, New York
1974) [hereinafter HEILBRUN]; Grodzins, The Crisis of the Inner City, in URBAN CRISIS IN MODERN AMERICA 66 (R. Branyon & L. Larsen eds. 1971) [Hereinafter URBAN CRISIS]. See generally
B. HARRISON, URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: SUBURBANIZATION, MINORITY OPPORTUNITY
AND THE CONDITION OF THE CENTRAL CITY 63-75 (Urban Inst., Wash. D.C. 1974) [Hereinafter
HARRISON].

5. Grodzins, supra note 4 in URBAN CRISIS, at 67; HARRISON, supra note 4, at 77-78;
Duncan & Reiss, Suburban Growth Patterns, in URBAN CRISIS 29; HEILBRUN, supra note 4, at 3031, 184-85.
6. Grodzins, supra note 4 in URBAN CRISIS, at 70; See generally, HEILBRUN, supra note 4, at
40-44, 184-85, 190; M. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION (Columbia University Press,
New York 1976) [Hereinafter DANIELSON].
7. HEILBRUN, supra note 4, at 322-27; See generally, U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA(1974), [Hereinafter EQUAL OPPORTUNITY].
8. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 7, at 11; DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 23, 141-48.
9. See REPORT, NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 126 (1968) [Hereinafter
REPORT]. Though it is somewhat dated the picture painted by the Commission remains accurate.

For example Bureau of Labor Statistics data shows 43.3% black teenagers (aged 16-19) in urban
areas unemployed. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Special Labor Reports, No. 199, "Employ-
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Neighborhoods deteriorated as reinvestment ceased'0 leaving empty
boarded buildings which stand as mocking monuments of housing
abandonment, business withdrawal, and core city deterioration.
City problems, indeed, constitute a catalogue of ills which cannot
possibly be attributed to any single cause. Nor can any solution addressed to a single factor reverse the trend.
There is, however, an overwhelming irony that the "better life" has
always eluded the poor and the black, as masses. When they
predominated in rural areas, the good life was "The City." When they
got there, the good life was "The Suburb." To that place neither poor2
nor black can go.II Either there are no homes that they can afford,'
or they are barred in other ingenious and devious
ways' 3 through use
4
controls.'
use
land
local
of
sorts
various
of
It would probably not be an overstatement to say that a battle is
being waged on two fronts: the "saving" of the American cities' 5 and
the "opening" of the American suburbs. 6 Joining the battle on the
latter front, this article poses two questions: Are suburban actions
which exclude poor and black people tolerable in light of the broader,
ment and Unemployment in 1976" (1977). See also U.S. Bureau of Census, Current Population
Reports, Series P-60, No. 107, (1977).
10. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 7, at 9. See also REPORT, supra note 9, at 220; and
Whitman, Federal Housing Assistance and the Poor: Old Problems and New Directions, 9 Urb.
Law. 1 (1977).
11. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 7, at 4-7. See generaly, DANIELSON, supra note 6. Of
course, the statement is not intended to imply that no blacks or poor reside in the suburbs, but
merely that generally the picture is one of exclusion. Indeed the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in
its report, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING (1975) [Hereinafter
TWENTY YEARS) while finding that "a small but significant number of blacks" moved to the
suburbs in the decades between 1954 and 1974 continued by noting that: "[B]iacks have located
through a pattern that primarily establishes or reinforces pockets of minority population. Only a
small number of blacks has moved into predominantly white neighborhoods." Id at 134. See
also H. ROSE, BLACK SUBURBANIZATION, (Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mass. 1976).
12. See e.g., EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 7.
13. Grodzins, supra note 4 in URBAN CRISIS, at 67; HEILBRUN, supra note 4, at 308. Seealso
NAT'L COMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING AND URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, FAIR

HOUSING AND EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE 57 (1974) [Hereinafter FAIR HOUSING), listing some
twenty-four practices which can lead to exclusionary results.
14. The phrase "land use controls" in this article is used as a general descriptive phrase to
include all powers exercised by local government which can be used to control the placement of
housing or the utilization of land. For purposes of the discussion the phrase "land use controls"
includes zoning, growth limitations, referenda, building moratoria, refusals to issue building permits or provide services, refusals to rezone, prohibitions on dwelling types, square footage requirements, developer fees, and developmental timing controls. The list of such powers is practically
endless.
15. For example, proponents of "saving" the cities are seeking targeted federal aid for "distressed" cities as part of the housing legislation for fiscal 1978, see 5 BNA, Hous. & DEV. REP.,
CurrentDevelopments 304 (September 19, 1977), and are pushing for new urban policy initiatives.
See, Community Development Services, Inc., 77 Housing Affairs Letter, No. 4, p. 1 (November 4,
1977).
16. See DANIELSON, supra note 6, chs. 7-11; EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 7, at 51-70,
FAIR HOUSING, supra note 13, at 7ff.
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longterm national interest? Assuming they are not, what should be
done about them?
The problems are extremely complex and highly sensitive. Central
cities' problems, suburban sprawl and rural development are related-indeed the relationship is symbiotic. 7 Fundamental values are
in apparent conflict: the tradition of local land use autonomy versus the
national interests; and free association versus a curtailed associational
freedom. Yet, if the problems are to be addressed at all meaningfully,
something has got to yield!
Local autonomy as an important value is not to be minimized, especially in an age of massive governmental bureaucracies and diminished
efficacy of individual political effort as the relevant political apparatus
becomes larger. 8 But, I will attempt to show that suburban local governmental units may, and do, undermine national objectives, for example, by refusing to engage in federally supported lower income housing
programs and, by excluding black people and poor people, thereby exacerbating already tragic metropolitan ills.
The freedom to associate is, of course, highly important. The associational issue may be posed as, "Whether the members of the affluent
white majority should be denied freedom to associate exclusively with
like persons, when by definition in so doing the black and the poor are
necessarily excluded?" Few, if any, persons would deny that somewhere a line must be drawn on the mixing impulse. Presumably also,
even poor people and black people have associational freedoms which
ought to be recognized. Traditionally, it may be thought that "public"
and "private" lines may be drawn.' 9
17. TWENTY YEARS, supra note 11, at 1-13; REPORT, supra note 9, at 115-21.
18. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls. An Economic and LegalAnalysi, 86 YALE L.J. 385,
405 (1977). See also Tucker, Inside Ghetto Walls, supra note 4 in URBAN Ciusis, at 174-76.
19. The distinction between "public" and "private" action is essentially the "state action"
problem which arises under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. As an example
of the analysis of the state action problem in general see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961). In the particular context of resistance to federal housing programs, see e.g.,
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied
401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970). In the case of the
homogeneous, affluent, white suburban community the distinction between public and private
impulses becomes blurred to the point of virtual extinction. Officials are known, are close to the
voters (in smaller areas particularly), and are likely to personally share the interests of the residents. See e.g., Ellickson, supra note 18.
Nevertheless it is necessary to distinguish, even in a discussion of suburban exclusion, between
conduct of a landowner who desires to select his neighbors by purchasing, for example, a large
tract of land and controlling who lives next to him and at what proximity. However, if a landowner does not, for whatever reason, do that, but instead makes the local government a surrogate
to carry out his desires, his conduct is no longer private. At the instant the government carries out
his desires the conduct becomes public. Even in making this analysis one must yet recognize the
dimension that necessarily implicates "associational" issues. Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland,

431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Legislative recognition of the interest in associational freedom (perhaps mixed with individual
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Adherence to the tradition of local autonomy 20 and unrestrained associational freedom in the context of suburban exclusion works to em-

barrass the national effort.

Having historically been left virtually

unrestrained,2 ' "devotion to democracy" 2 2 in the suburbs now accom-

plishes, in official ways, a result not merely local or private, but fraught
with serious national and public implications.
It would appear to be self-evident that politically a nation balkanized

along class and race lines cannot be optimally as healthy as it would be
without such divisions. Socially, and perhaps morally, it is at least unfair, if not inhumane, for one generation, whether by action or inaction,
to leave avoidable divisions, mistrusts, suspicions, estrangements and
hatreds as legacies to generations unborn and, by hypothesis, innocent.

It may be that selfish motivation, if rational, can produce responses
with altruistic and selfless dimensions. Even selfish parents, if rational, would not purposely and knowingly burden their children and
grandchildren with debilitating divisions among people, if they could
avoid doing so. Such divisions will inevitably create pervasive antagonisms and political stresses with which future generations must contend. Presently sufficiently intractable, the divisions will be even more

so, as they have longer to become ingrained facts of life and to gnaw

away at the nation's soul.23 These observations are deemed sufficiently credible to warrant a sense of national urgency calling for emer-

gency action.

4

privacy interests) can also be found in the 1964 Civil Rights Act's exemption of "private clubs"
from the prohibitions on discrimination contained in the act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(e) (1974)
(prohibiting discrimination in public accomodations), and in the 1968 Civil Rights Act's exemption, inter alia, of single family homes in certain circumstances and four unit or less dwellings
when the owner resides in one of the units (the "Mrs. Murphy" exemption), 42 U.S.C.A. § 3603
(1973), as well as private clubs. 42 U.S.C-A. § 3607 (1973). Butsee 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982 (1866) as
interpreted to bar even private discrimination in certain circumstances, particularly the sale of
housing. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
20. See text accompanying notes 79-101 infra.
21. Id.
22. This is a phrase used by the Court in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971). In that
case, plaintiffs were challenging a referendum procedure which required an affirmative vote of a
majority of the qualified electors before any "low rent housing project" could be financed in whole
or in part by the federal or state governments. The Court's full statement was, "Provisions for
referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination or prejudice." Id
See also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
23. See EQUAL OPPoRTuNrrY, supra note 7, at 14-15; REPORT, supra note 9, at 220-21.
24. See REPORT, supra note 9, at 1, 220. This National Commission concluded: "Our nation
is moving toward two societies, one black, one white--separate and unequal." Id. at I. It also
spoke of the risk of "the permanent establishment of two societies: one predominantly white and
located in the suburbs, in smaller cities, and in outlying areas, and one largely Negro located in
central cities." Id. at 220.
Although it might be suggested that the trend of white out-migration is starting to show limited
signs of a partial reversal in that some middle-income whites are returning to central city areas,
see, e.g., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, August 8, 1977, at 69-71, current data does not suggest
the quite massive reversal that would be required. Ironically the return of the white middle class
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The thesis of this article is that America has no complete or consistent overall national housing policy, and in particular, no complete or
consistent national policy regarding suburban exclusion or inclusion by
race and economic class. Fragments of policy, often contradictory, can
be found in scattered parts of housing and community development
legislation and other related laws. But nowhere in all the national
housing legislation or the housing related civil rights legislation can
there be found a specific, clear, consistent, straightforward, or practically enforcible, inclusionary policy.
Several lower federal courts, 25 and at least one courageous state
court of last resort,' have been attempting to develop and enforce
piecemeal nonexclusionary policies. Such attempts have not proved
effective as a general remedy. One of the more important reasons is
that court resolutions necessarily take place both in the context of legislative policies which are contradictory, incomplete and ambiguous, and
of administrative implementational systems which are complex, cumbersome and confusing.2 7

On the few occasions it has spoken on the subject, the United States
Supreme Court has taken a constitutional approach to the problem of
suburban exclusion which is lacking in practical utility and has never
addressed the inclusion issue as it can be differentiated from exclusion.
Moreover, it seems probable that the issues will not be resolved on constitutional grounds in a manner that will lead to suburban inclusion.
And I believe that, if decided under current constitutional precepts, the
issues are likely to be resolved in a fashion that will make suburban
28
inclusion litigation practically impossible to maintain successfully.
In my view, such a resolution would not advance the longterm political,
social and economic interests of the nation. It must be pointed out,
however, that the problems presented by existing federal housing and
development legislation would prevent even a willing judiciary from
developing effective, practically useful doctrines or enforcement
may well compound the problem of the central city poor by pushing them out, by causing higher
price demands. Id See also an editorial in the New York Times, July 1, 1977 entitled "When
City Revival Drives Out the Poor." Rather than lessening the need to open up the suburbs, there
is strong indication that the efforts should be intensified, precisely because of the reversal of the
white out-migration phenomenon. Moreover events are in too early a stage to permit a final
conclusion about its dimensions.
25. E.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affd
per curnam, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
26. Southern Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). Cf. Golden v. Planning Board of Town of
Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972), appeal dismied, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
27. See Part I-C infra.
28. See Part I-B infra.
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tools.

29

My conclusion is that judicial unwillingness to extend constitutional
decision-making to command suburban inclusion, when combined
with the lack of a clear legislative mandate in doctrine and enforcement
tools portends ultimate ill for longterm national interests. Therefore in
this article, I will attempt to demonstrate that it is up to Congress to
enunciate a clear, consistent, national policy mandating suburban inclusion, and to provide effective tools for judicial enforcement of that
policy. I will also append a draft of a statute which if enacted would
accomplish these purposes.
First, the direction of the current Supreme Court will be examined.
Arguments will be advanced that the Court's direction is wrong in the
sense of being unwise as national housing policy, but that a change in
direction under the present Court majority seems unlikely because the
needed change would require the Court to adopt a controversial social
theory as a predicate for constituional policy-making. Next, current
legislative policies will be analyzed. This analysis will show that the
legislative policies are so unclear that the present Court which is
headed in the "wrong" direction under the Constitution, is not likely to
impart to the ambiguous legislative command of the housing and related laws the same controversial social theory the Court is unwilling to
adopt for constitutional purposes. Finally, the analysis will demonstrate that even if the doctrine (either constitutional or statutory) existed to command suburban inclusion, the available judicially
developed and statutorily provided enforcement tools would not permit
the judiciary to grant remedies that would be effective in mandating
suburban inclusion.
Thus, unless the nation can afford to wait for a Supreme Court majority willing to mandate suburban inclusion, which cannot practically
be assured or predicted and unless effective judicial remedies are devised promptly, which is most unlikely, the Congress must respond
with clear legislative policies which mandate suburban inclusion, and
must provide practical and effective tools to enforce the mandate. If
Congress fails or refuses to do so the problem inevitably will worsen.
B.

ConstitutionalLitigation.: A Foreclosingof Relief

1. Prolegomenon
There is, of course, no Federal constitutional provision which speaks
directly to the issue of suburban exclusion or inclusion by race or economic class. The presumptive starting point for analysis of general
suburban exclusion along race or economic class lines would seem to
29. See text accompanying notes 220-39 infra.
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be the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by Brown v. Boardof Education,3 0 although, as discussed later, other constitutional bases for
striking down facial invidious classifications by race may be available 3'
or may be developable. 32 But does Brown say anything applicable to
the suburban exclusion problem? Whatever the premise of Brown's
result,3 3 its holding is that "[I1n the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. ' 34 The Court did not explain the logic that applies Brown to fields other than public
education. 35 But, even assuming the applicability of its holding to facial invidious classifications by race, making all such classifications unconstitutional, the problem of suburban exclusion generally does not
involve facial invidious classifications by race or class.3 6 In any event,
a preclusion of such classifications for exclusion purposes might not be
the same as mandating inclusion in the housing area by race and economic class. There is a rather significant gap between prohibitingexclusion because of race, or, even, class, and requiringinclusion on these
bases.3 7
At the height of the reign of the doctrine of "separate but equal" 3 an
ordinance limiting sale/purchase rights of landowners by a racial classification appearing on the face of the ordinance was held, in Buchanan
v. Warley, I to violate a landowner's due process rights. Nine years
later the Court, using a due process analytical approach, provided the
rationale for assessing the validity of "comprehensive" zoning controls' in the well-known Euclid v. Ambler4 decision. Due process as a
peg for mandating suburban inclusion, however, appears rather un30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. See text accompanying notes 74-100 infra.
32. See text accompanying notes 150-52 infra.
33.

See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 452-55 (Little, Brown & Co. 1973).

34. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (emphasis added).
35. See Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciples of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22
(1959). Nor, in my judgment has the Court explained the rationale of Brown subsequent to Professor Wechsler's criticisms.
36. For a discussion of a representative problem of land use controls, see text accompanying
notes 46-48 infra. See also note 14 supra.
37. See text accompanying notes 216-17 infra.
38. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). The Court described the ordinance as follows:
By the first section of the ordinance it is made unlawful for any colored person to move into and
occupy as a residence, place of abode, or to establish and maintain as a place of public assembly
any house upon any block upon which a greater number of houses are occupied as residences,
places of abode, or places of public assembly by white people than are occupied as residences,
places of abode, or places of public assembly by colored people.
Section 2 provides that it shall be unlawful for any white person to move into and occupy as a
residence, place of abode, or to establish and maintain as a place of public assembly any house
upon any block on which a greater number of houses are occupied as residences, places of abode
or places of public assembly by colored people than are occupied as residences, places of abode or
places of public assembly by white people. Id. at 70-71.
40. For a discussion of the distinctions between various types of zoning, see generally D.
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promising. It is highly unlikely that due process of any non-substantive variety could

be fashioned

to address the suburban

exclusion/inclusion problem. Essentially "the process" is not the heart
of the problem. The problem inheres in the consequences of a process
which all would, presumably, concede to meet the procedural interest
in fundamental fairness.4 2 Even a "substantive" due process would be

problematic. There may not exist a judicially recognizable interest on

the part of persons excluded by local land use restrictions,4 3 and the
content of such due process would require cloaking a controversial so-

cial policy in constitutional garb.'
2. The Dominant Constitutional Lines
Equal protection and due process, nevertheless, seem to be the two
dominant constitutional lines for dealing with problems of local land
use controls and the exclusion/inclusion problem. 45 Over a half century after the initial application of the due process clause to the land

use problem and after a quarter century following the application of
the equal protection clause to that problem, the Supreme Court merged
the two heretofore separate approaches to land use problems. The two

separate, but similar, doctrinal approaches reached a point of confluence in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Development
Corporation.4
Arlington involved a suit by a housing development corporation
(Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, hereinafter
"MHDC"), and others, against the Village of Arlington Heights, which
refused to rezone a tract of land to permit the building of housing using
federal financial assistance. MHDC claimed the refusal to rezone violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment beHAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW

§§

28-32, 41-52 (West

1971) [Hereinafter HAGMAN]. See text accompanying notes 83-93 infra.
41. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
42. The issue of procedural fairness is separable entirely from the issue of whether even a fair
procedure produces an exclusionary result. Where procedural issues existed they could, of
course, be adjudicated.
43. See text accompanying notes 121-122 infra.
44. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
45. This is simply an observation based on the number of cases in the Supreme Court which
have touched on land use issues. The more significant cases will be discussed under the present
topic of this article. Other theories or constitutional bases have been suggested however. See
text accompanying notes 151-154 infra.
46. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). As will be more fully developed, the treatment of cases under the
equal protection and due process clauses seems to have developed along two separate lines. Arlington's analysis of the discrimination issue for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects
the same analytical insensitivity to the impact and inherent tendencies of zoning that the Court
first evidenced in zoning cases arising under the due process clause. Thus the confluence between
the lines in terms of analytical approach.
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cause the refusal to rezone had a racially discriminatory effect. The
Court acknowledged this, recognizing that "[t]he impact of the Village's decision does arguably bear more heavily on racial minorities, a7
but held nevertheless that proof of a "discriminatory purpose" was necessary to establish a constitutionalviolation. a
Based on the state of the development of due process and equal protection as the lines came to merge in Arlington it can be seen that constitutional litigation does not offer ready solutions to the problem of
suburban exclusion. There are two general approaches in explication
of this view. One is that Arlington represents an unworkable approach
to the issue qua the issue of controlling suburban impulses to exclude
since applying the Arlington analysis will preclude reaching the bulk of
suburban behavior which is likely to result in exclusion by race. That
conclusion is demonstrable. The second is that Arlington is inconsistent either with the Court's equal protection line of cases on local land
use control or with the due process line of cases dealing with local land
use control, or both. Analysis will show, however, that Arlington is not
necessarily inconsistent with the equal protection line of cases dealing
with racial discrimination or with the due process line of Supreme
Court cases dealing with control of local land use. But, conversely, it
is demonstrable that Arlington was not precedentially compelled. 9
Ar'inton is seen by the Supreme Court as based on Washington v.
Davis,5 in which the Couit held that an employment test neutral on its
face could not be found discriminatory, for constitutional purposes,
merely by showing that the test disqualified a disproportionate number
of minorities. It announced a constitutional test for proving invidious
discrimination which requires a showing of "discriminatory purpose."'" This was a giant step backwards in the employment discrimi47. Id. at 269.
48. Id. at 270.
49. There is no doubt but that Arlington is properly regarded as a serious setback to advocates of a constitutional remedy to suburban exclusion. Also Arlington may be seen as mocking
the result of Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). In Gautreaux the Court sanctioned the
placement of public housing in the suburbs of Chicago as a remedy for public housing segregation
in the City of Chicago which segregation was created by actions of the City of Chicago with funds
provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Arlington involved a
village which is a suburb of Chicago and is within the metropolitan housing area. If all, or any
significant number of such suburbs are zoned similar to Arlington Heights, and refuse to cooperate with the Chicago Housing Authority, or refuse to participate in other federally-aided housing
programs, patently the Gautreaux remedy will be a "cruel hoax", similar to that spoken of by
Professor Berger. See Berger, /omeownershp/or Lower Income Families-The 1968 Act's "Cruel
Hoax'" 2 CoNN. L. REv. 30 (1969). The reason will be that the promise held out by Gautreaux
will be impossible to realize. In that sense we will have the "illusion" which Professor McGee
convincingly demonstrates. See, McGee, Illusion and Contradiction in the Questfor a Desegregated Metropolis, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 948.
50. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
51. Id. at 240. That "purpose", according to the Court, may be shown by "systematic" in-
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nation area, especially when Washington v. Davis is juxtaposed with
Griggs v. Duke PowerCo.5 2 Griggs held that regardless of the absence
of an intent to discriminate, a test which operated to disqualify a disproportionate number of minorities was prohibited under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, unless the test was demonstrably a reasonable measure of job related performance.5 3 The foundation of Griggs
is Congressional policy; of Washington v. Davis, the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. I turn now to an analysis of Supreme Court
doctrine based on equal protection and due process to outline the limits
of their utility for solving the suburban exclusion problem.
(a) Equal Protection
Analysis of racial discrimination cases under the equal protection
clause reveals that before Washington v. Davis the Court had not rendered a specific decision on the threshold standards of proof for showing racial discrimination, and that not until Arlington was the threshold
standards issue presented in the zoning or local land use context.
The question of threshold standards does not arise when the challenged action makes an explicit racial classification. Thus in Brown v.
Board of Education and its progeny the Court was never called on to
determine thresholds of proof because the classifications at issue were
facial. The issue in Brown-type cases was whether the classifications
were prohibited. Indeed, in this light the difference between Brown
and Plessey v. Ferguson5 4 is simply that Brown prohibited classifications Plessey permitted, at least as long as there existed "equality" between the classified groups.5 5
The only post-Brown education case to present the thresholds question was Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1,56 in which the Court avoided
the issue. Because of fimdings of dejure discriminatory acts the Court
was not required to rule, and has never ruled, on whether defacto
school segregation violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The Court
vidiously discriminatory conduct, id. at 241, or "intent" to discriminate, id. at 240, or proof that
action "bears more heavily on one race than another" in circumstances where the burden placed
on the disadvantaged group "is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds" which will permit
an inference of "an invidious discriminatory purpose." Id. at 242.
52. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
53. Id. at 436.
54. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
55. It may be rightly pointed out that the Court took a flight from reality to suppose that

separate between blacks and supremacy-minded whites who imposed the separation could ever be
equal. At least history clearly belies the Court's judgment. See generaly, R. KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE (Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1976).
56. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
57. This is simply another way of asking the question whether there is a constitutional right
to a non-segregated education, or merely to an education not purposely caused to be segregated

by the state or its agents. Put in this light one can see the parallel between the two prongs of that
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differentiated dejure from defacto segregation by stating that dejure
discrimination requires intent or purpose to segregate,58 but that as for
defacto segregation discriminatory intent or purpose is unproven.
The first case I have found in which the Court struck down a municipal ordinance as violating the equalprotection clause because of racial
classifications is Yick Wo v. Hopkins.5 9 In Yick Wo the Court held
that an ordinance neutral on its face could be applied in a manner
which violated the equal protection clause. The ordinance in question
regulated the operation of laundries, and required owners of any laundry not located in a brick structure to apply to the local government 6
for a permit to operate. After enactment of the ordinance, no Chinese
person who applied for a permit was issued one, but all white persons
who applied, save one, were granted permits. The Court held that
Chinese incarcerated for violating the ordinance by operating laundries
without permits must be discharged from custody.
Since the ordinance was facially neutral (i.e. unlike the laws struck
down in Brown it did not within its very terms create racial classifications), a question is raised as to whether only the action taken under the
ordinance was unconstitutional or whether by reason of that action, the
ordinance itself was invalid. Analysis shows clearly the latter. The
Chinese were ordered discharged. No injunction was sought or
granted requiring henceforth that the ordinance be equally and nondiscriminatorily applied. Accordingly, Yick Wo was not a case in
which a law was merely invalid as applied, but one in which the law
itself was held unconstitutional because its application clearly evinced
discriminatory intent.6 '
The Court was not called on to address the question of discrimination thresholds, however, because the fact of the purposeful discriminainquiry and the Griggs versus Washington v. Davis results. Griggs finds that there exists a statutory right in blacks not to be disproportionately disqualified by a test which is not shown to be job
related. Washington v. Davis, however, fmds no such right under the Constitution, but merely a
more limited right not to be disqualified by a test purposely designed to disqualify blacks. Thus
there is no Constitutional right to a job related test. Similarly, up to the present time, the Court
has refused to enunciate a right to a non-segregated education. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717 (1974).
58. 413 U.S. at 205, 208.
59. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

60. "Local government" is here used as a generic description of governing local governmental bodies. In Yick Wo the local governmental body was called the Board of Supervisors of the
City of San Francisco.
61. It might be pointed out that since the ordinance was facially neutral and was merely
applied in a way that resulted in the denial of permits to Chinese persons the case arguably is one
in which an "effects test" was in fact applied. However, since the Court in Washington v. Davis
denied that it had "embraced" an effects test, see text accompanying note 137 infra, for analytical
purposes and to avoid charging the court with a lack of candor, I have chosen to give Yick Wo an
interpretation that avoids raising an issue of the Court's candor.
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tory application of the law was admitted.6 2 The analytical
methodology of the Court was, in effect, to impute an intent to discriminate to the ordinance, i.e. to treat the post-enactment invidious application as demonstrating the law's invidious intent.
Discussing how the facially neutral ordinance could be found "inoperative and void" the Court reasoned:
This conclusion, and the reasoning on which it is based, are deductions from the face of the ordinance, as to its necessary tendency and
ultimate actual operation. In the present cases we are not obliged to
reason from the probable to the actual, and pass on the validity of the
ordinances complained of, as tried merely by the opportunities which
their terms afford, of unequal and unjust discrimination in their administration. For the cases present the ordinances in actual operation, and
the facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively
against a particular class of persons as to warrantandrequirethe conclusion, that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as
adopted, they are appliedby thepublic authoritieschargedwith their administration, and thus representing the State itself, with a mind so unequal andoppressive as to amount to apracticaldenialby the State of...
equalprotectionof the laws. . . Though the law itself be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial
of equal justice is still
63
within the prohibition of the Constitution.
Given the absence of any reason to justify the admitted discrimination
in application, the ordinance could not stand. Without such justification the ordinance was clearly beyond all thresholds that might be examined to determine whether prohibited discrimination was present.
There was a hiatus of over eighty years before the next decision in
the equal protection line of cases dealing with local land use issues.
This case, Hunter v. Erickson,' involved the validity of a provision of a
local government's charter which required that any ordinance regulating real property transactions on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry be submitted to a referendum before the
ordinance could become effective. Any such existing ordinance was
repealed until approved in a referendum.6 5 The Court declared the
charter provision invalid because it classified ordinances on racial
grounds, and thus disadvantaged those who would benefit from ordinances prohibiting the discrimination. Since the charter provision, as
62.
63.
64.
65.

118 U.S. at 374.
Id. at 373-74 (emphasis added).
393 U.S. 385 (1969).
Id. at 387.
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thus interpreted, contained a facial classification, the question of discrimination thresholds was not presented.
James Y. Va/tierra66 came next. In upholding a mandatory referendum requirement for any "low rent housing project, ' 67 the Court emphasized that the referendum requirement contained no facial
classification touching upon race, and noted without elaboration that

seemingly
"[T]he record here [will] not support any claim that a law
6
neutral on its face is infact aimed at a racial minority.
Finally there is Arlington.69 It is instructive to observe that of the
four directly traceable equal protection, land use and racial discrimina-

tion cases, the two in which violations of the constitution have been
found are facial classifications: explicit classifications in the case of
Hunter,70 and action tantamount to such a classification, or perhaps
analytically a "constructive" classification, in Yick Wo. 71 Since
Brown72 and its progeny deal only with facial or dejure classifications

66. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
67. The referendum provision required a favorable majority vote of the qualified electors
before any "low rent housing project" could be developed, constructed, or acquired in any city,
town, or county. It defined "low rent housing project" as any dwellings "for persons of low
income financed in whole or in part by the Federal Government or a state public body or to which
" It defined "persons of
the Federal Government or a state public body extends assistance ..
low income" as any "persons or families who lack the amount of income which is necessary...
to enable them, without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe and sanitary dwellings, without
overcrowding." Id. at 139, n.2.
That this provision evidenced an animus against poor persons is too clear for dispute. That the
Court treated it as evidencing "devotion to democracy", supra note 22, betrays a marked insensitivity to the realities involved. That so vicious a provision was treated as something benign and
harmless should shock the conscience of a fair-minded sensitive person.
68. 402 U.S. at 141 (emphasis added). Given the Court's reasoning, it is unclear whether it
would have made any difference if the occupants of low rent housing consisted of a substantial
number of persons of a racial minority, and that such persons would have been excluded by the
operation of the referendum provision, at least so long as the exclusion was not as total as that in
Yick Wo. See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra. After Arlington, see text accompanying
notes 143-146 infra, presumably the exclusion of a substantial number of minority persons would
not make out a Constitutional violation, so long as some reasons could be advanced which could
justify the challenged conduct on non-racial grounds.
In Vallierra the Court accepted the highly speculative argument that the referendum gave local
people "a voice in a decision which may lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds
for increased public services and to lower tax revenues," 402 U.S. at 143. While the statement
may have been accurate as for public housing, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1410(h) (1969) as amended 42
U.S.C.A. § 1437d(d) (Supp. 1977), it clearly was not necessarily accurate as to other programs.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1 (1969) as amended 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-1 (Supp. 1977). At all
events, the statement ignores the question of whether any expenditures required for services to low
rent housing would be significantly greater than those for private housing which was not subject to
the referendum requirement. Cf. R. MACE & W. WICKER, Do SINGLE FAMILY HOMES PAY
THEIR WAY?

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COSTS AND REVENUES FOR PUBLIC SERVICES, (Ur-

ban Land Institute, Wash. D.C., 1968) (Research Monograph No. 15).
69. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
70. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
71. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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by race (at least with the Keyes73 refusal to address the defacto issue),
it appears rather plain that the Supreme Court has not engaged in expansive constitutional policy-making in approaching the question of
what constitutes prohibited racial discrimination by local land use action under the equal protection clause.
(b) Due Process
Analysis of due process cases dealing with local land use issues similarly yields the conclusion that the Supreme Court has not engaged in
expansive policy-making. Buchanan v. Warley, briefly discussed earlier as a case in the due process line,74 can be analyzed as something
other than a due process case, notwithstanding that its rationale is
stated by the Court to be due process. Recall that in Buchanan, the
ordinance, in effect, restricted sale/purchase rights by racial classifications. The Court held, at the instance of a white suitor, that the ordinance was invalid because it restricted the sale of city lots between
black and white persons to lots on blocks in which each respective race
occupied the greater number of residences. A white seller of a lot sued
a black purchaser for specific performance of a contract which was
conditioned on the purchaser's being able to occupy the lot in question
as a residence. The purchaser pleaded the ordinance as a defense alleging that he was black, and that whites occupied the majority of residences on the block. The seller countered that the ordinance was
invalid. The Court agreed, holding that it violated the seller's due
process right to alienate his property.
Buchanan, in the hey-day of Plessey,75 was clearly a difficult case,7 6
and required a more substantial rationale7 7 than it appears the Court
would have thought necessary post-Brown. 78 This conclusion suggests
a reinterpretation of Buchanan to the equal protection line of prohibited facial classifications assumed to be prohibited by Brown.79 However, the opinion in Buchanan remains pertinent to this discussion
because the Court went out of its way to pay homage to local land use
73. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
74. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
75. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
76. It had some of the earmarks of "friendly litigation." For example the seller permitted
the buyer to insert a clause making the sale conditional upon the buyer's right to occupy the
premises as a personal residence. 245 U.S. at 60-70. Nevertheless, after argument of the case, the
Court restored the case to the docket, and it was reargued. Id. at 60.
77. A good deal of the Court's discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment and the provisions
of the statute now codified as 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982 in the opinion, in light of the Court's final
rationale on due process grounds, is clearly dictum.
78. See Pollock, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity. A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. PENN. L. REv. 1, 10 (1959).
79. See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
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authority: "The authority of the State [acting through a local government] to pass laws [ordinances] in the exercise of the police power...
... 1
is very broad.
The Court in its first view of comprehensive zoning,81 in Euclid v.
Ambler,8 2 clearly affirmed that it was not inclined, in general, to conduct searching examinations of local land use controls-a view it had
intimated in Buchanan. In Euclid a landowner sued to enjoin enforce-

ment of a comprehensive ordinance imposing certain restrictions on the
use of his land.83 He claimed violations of the equal protection and
due process clauses. The Court rejected the claims altogether, holding
that the general restrictions on uses were not unreasonable or confiscatory. The Court's discussion does not delineate any differeneces be-

tween the equal protection and due process analyses. Perhaps this is
because a mere regulatory classification pursuant to the police power
requires no more in the way of justification under the equal protection
test than the due process test for determining whether a land use restriction is permissible. 8' More likely, however, the Court's framing of
the issue in terms of the landowner's "right of property"8 5 protected
under the due process clause reveals the true basis of the Court's decision, with
the equal protection allegation treated sub silentio or ig86
nored.
80. 245 U.S. at 74.
81. See generally, HAGMAN § 28, supra note 40.
82. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
83. Essentially, the landowner claimed that the usage limitations imposed by the ordinance
on his lands diminished their marketability for industrial and commercial purposes and thus reduced their value substantially.
84. Generally speaking, due process challenges to zoning assert improper use of the police
power. To succeed it must be shown that the challenged action bears no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. This is, of course, the Euclid standard. 272
U.S. at 395. Under the equal protection clause a mere regulatory classification will be sustained
against attack if the classification bears a rational relationship to any permissible state objective,
e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Analytically the two standards seem to
amount to the same thing.
85. 272 U.S. at 386.
86. The District Court's decision which was reversed had not relied on the equal protection
clause. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 365
(1926).
In the context of a discussion of suburban exclusion the lower court's insightful analysis of the
object of the ordinance is pregnant with poignance:
The plain truth is that the true object of the ordinance in question is to place all the property in an undeveloped area of 16 square miles in a strait-jacket. The purpose to be accomplished is really to regulate the mode of living of persons who may hereafter inhabit it. In
the last analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and segregate them
according to their income or situation in life. The true reason why some persons live in a
mansion and others in a shack, why some live in a single-family dwelling and others in a
double-family dwelling, why some live in a two-family dwelling and others in an apartment,
or why some live in a well-kept apartment and others in a tenement, is primarily economic.
It is a matter of income and wealth, plus the labor and difficulty of procuring adequate
domestic service. Aside from contributing to these results and furthering such class tenden-
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As if to presage an analysis that would be adopted by Arlington87
over fifty years later for the equal protection line of cases in the land
use area,88 the Court in Euclid found the landowner's allegations that a
69-acre tract was reduced in value from $10,000 per acre to $2,500 per
acre so analytically inconsequential as to necessitate no explicit balancing.89 Also the Court betrayed acute insensitivity to the exclusionary
and segregative impacts land use ordinances, by definition, are
designed to have, with particular reference to multifamily development. On this latter point the Court opined:
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that
the development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the
coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for private house purposes; that in such sections
very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order
to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district. Moreover, the coming
of one apartment house is followed by others, interfering by their
height and bulk with the free circulation of air and monopolizing the
rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes and
bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of
moving and parked automobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus
detracting from their safety and depriving children of the privilege of
quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities,-until, finally, the residential character of the neighborhood and
its desirability as a place of detached residences are utterly destroyed.
Under these circumstances, apartment houses, which in a different environment would be not only unobjectionable but highly desirable,
come very near to being nuisances.9
Given this rather unsympathetic due process analysis, it seems clear
that a fundamental shift in the Court's thinking would be required to
permit the Court to undertake a doctrinally developmental role leading
to constitutional doctrines upon which to mandate an inclusionary suburbia. The Court's later pronouncements in the due process line are
far from that.
Euclid, as noted, involved a broadside challenge to the ordinance on
its face, and the Court did not reach the question of any discrete applications of the ordinance to the landowner. In short order Nectow v.
cies, the ordinance has also an esthetic purpose; that is to say, to make this village develop
into a city along lines now conceived by the village council to be attractive and beautiful.
297 F. at 316.
87. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
88. Id. at 269.
89. 272 U.S. at 384.
90. Id. at 394-95.
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City of Cambridge9 1 presented the issue of particular applications.
Here, the Court, paying homage to the principles of a limited judicial
role under the due process clause, stated that the local zoning ordinance restrictions would be upheld unless it could be demonstrated that
the restrictions had "no foundation in reason" and constituted "a mere
arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation
to the public health, the public morals, the public safety or the public
welfare in its proper sense." 92 Recognizing that the restrictions placed
on the land in question were not indispensible to the general plan of the
ordinance, the Court nevertheless thought it would not be warranted in
striking down the ordinance on that basis. But based on the special
master's additional findings that the restrictions also did not promote
the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the city's inhabitants, and that the invasion upon the landowner's interest was "serious
and highly injurious" the 93restrictions were held to violate the landowner's due process rights.
Although the Court considered other due process cases in the Following four decades, 94 the next case to raise significant new issues was
Village ofBelle Terre v. Boraas.9" The case is difficult to classify as in
the equal protection or due process line. The Court's rationale is obscure. Analytically, the case raised issues of due process rights of a
landowner, and in part was treated as such by the Court, although the
interests of the landowner's tenants arguably presented equal protection issues. Belle Terre is discussed here in the due process line for two
principal reasons. First, because major reliance is placed on the review
doctrine announced in Euclid, and second, because the96Court in a subsequent case appears to treat it as a due process case.
The Village adopted an ordinance restricting land uses to one-family
dwellings, and defined family, with an exception not pertinent to this
91. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
92. Id. at 187-88.
93. Id. at 188.
94. Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1926) (Residential use zoning ordinance
upheld; no showing of clearly "unreasonable, arbitrary, or unequal exercise of power."); Gorieb v.
Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1926) (Building line ordinance upheld; the Court found that the ordinance
bore some relation to the public welfare and was not clearly arbitrary or unreasonable.); Seattle
Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (Permit to expand old folks home denied when builder
did not get written consent of nearby property owners as required by city ordinance. Held that
the power to grant a permit was arbitrary and bore no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare, and was therefore in violation of due process.); Standard Oil
Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1928) (Ordinance required gas storage tanks to be buried underground. Held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power in the interest of public
safety, despite hardship to complainant.); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (Ordinance passed making continuation of sand and gravel pit mining operation unfeasible. Held that
the ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the state's police power in the interest of public safety).
95. 416 U.S. 1 (1975).
96. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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discussion, to prohibit persons not related by blood, adoption or marriage from living and cooking together as a single unit. The owner of a
dwelling occupied by several tenants who were unrelated, together with
the tenants in that dwelling, sought to have the ordinance declared invalid.
Purporting to apply Euclid's principles, the Court upheld the ordinance as a permissible use of the municipality's police power, presumably because the Court thought the restrictions did have a rational
relationship to permissible objectives.9 7
Recently, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,98 the Court in a plurality opinion,91 struck down an ordinance which defined family in a
more restrictive way than that of the Village of Belle Terre."
The
landowner lived with her son and two grandsons. One grandson did
not fall within the ordinance's definition of "family" and thus the landowner was in violation of the ordinance. Looking to both Euclid and
Belle Terre, the Court held that the ordinance was not entitled to the
usual measure of deference accorded to state legislation because it intruded into freedom of personal choice in matters of family life which
the Court saw as protected "liberty" under the due process clause. It
should be noted that, not unlike Buchanan v. Warley, the ordinance's
classifications were facial, thus admitting no doubt as to either its impact or purpose.
Thus the due process cases governing review of municipal land use
ordinances impose, at best, a relaxed standard, becoming a bit more
stringent in only two instances: (1) when the challenged restriction in
the Court's view fails to promote something so ambiguous as the "public, health, safety, convenience or general welfare" and is highly injurious to a concrete interest of a landowner, and (2) when the challenged
restriction appears on the face of the ordinance and intrudes upon a
discrete interest the Court finds to be independently protected under
some constitutional provision.
3. Other Role Restriction Cases: The Routes Not Taken
Analysis of the equal protection and due process lines more than
suggests that the Court had no tradition of, nor familiar doctrine for,
97. 416 U.S. at 7, 8.
98. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Between Belle Terre and Moore the Court decided City of Eastlake
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), but it adds nothing to the analysis.
99. The Court's opinion was joined by four justices, with Mr. Justice Stevens concurring in

the judgment on separate grounds. Four justices dissented.
100. 431 U.S. at 496, n.2 for the terms of the ordinance. For our purposes suffice it to say that
the ordinance limited occupancy of dwelling units to members of a "family" and contained various definitions of family none of which permitted a woman to live with her son, and two grand-

sons, if one grandson was not the child of the son living with her!
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confronting the propositions it would have had to embrace to sustain
the claim of discrimination advanced in Arlington.'0 ' Against a severely restrained review tendency, clearly established in both the equal
protection and the due process precedents, it is lamentable, but surely
not surprising, that the Court was unwilling to devise the tools necessary to mandate inclusionary policies or at least prohibit exclusionary
ones. But consistent with its reluctance to devise tools to mandate in-

clusion, it also can be observed that on several occasions the Court
adopted restrictive doctrines which effectively foreclosed any opportunity for a doctrinally developmental role for the Court.
In the 1960's under the Warren Court it might have been argued that
housing was a "fundamental right" in the constitutional sense. As

such state or local conduct (including ordinances) impinging on hous-

ing interests, 10 2 under traditional analysis, would be called on to meet a

more exacting "scrutiny," and to be justified by a showing of "compelling reasons."

Then, in instances of ordinances with impacts bearing

more heavily on persons by reason of their housing need or housing

status, cases like Arlington, Valierra and others 0 3 would have been
subject to a different analytical approach not permitting the Court's
attitude of "abdication and abstention'
otherwise evidenced in the
Court's examination of local land use controls.

The entreaty to recognize housing as a fundamental right in the constitutional sense was emphatically declined by the Burger Court in
Lindsey v. Normet:'0 5 "We do not denigrate the importance of decent,
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to

101. Though not noted in the Arlington case (an equal protection case) presumably because
the due process and equal protection decisional lines were not seen as merging, Mr. Justice Stevens noted in the Moore case (a due process case) that there was a sparseness of Supreme Court
precedent on zoning issues: "The case-by-case development of the constitutional limits on the
zoning power has not... taken place in this Court." Id. at 1944 (Stevens, J. concurring in the
judgment).
102. For example, provisions like those in ValNerra, see note 67 supra.
103. Eg. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. 1 (1975), and Moore, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
104. This is the apt description of the Court's attitude in McGee, Illusion and Contradictionin
the Quest/ora Desegregated Metropolis, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 948.
105. 405 U.S. 56 (1972). The Plaintiffs challenged the State of Oregon's Forcible Entry and
Detainer statute under the equal protection clause. That statute, inter alia, provided expedited
procedures to landlords seeking to evict tenants and limited the triable issues to whether the
grounds asserted for eviction in the landlord's complaint were true. Thus it did not permit tenants to assert any affirmative defenses in the landlord's action for possession. The Plaintiffs who
were tenants urged that housing was a "fundamental right" for constitutional purposes and the
state's singling out of landlord-tenant actions for treatment different from other actions had to be
justified under the "compelling interest" test rather than the "rational basis" test. The Court held
that housing was not a fundamental right.
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dwellings of a particular quality .. ."I06 In this cryptic and overly

simplistic view the Court made a sharp turn to the restrictive route.
The broad overtones of the Court's statements, of course, are indisputable. These overtones, however, do not rationalize a result which
weighs burdens affecting housing needs on the same analytical scale as
a law imposing a special tax on stores that give trading stamps." 7
Moreover, Lindsey did not, as the Court implied, involve the claim of a
constitutional "right of access to dwellings."' 0 8
Perhaps a less mechanical equal protection analysis ought to have
been developed, thus relieving the Court of the perceived, but unarticulated, dilemma of choosing between a "mere rationality" or "compelling justifications" standard."0 Housing burdens may well need to be
subjected to something more than laissez-faire review without going all
the way to strict scrutiny. The traditional mere rationality standard
would sustain all but the most outrageous classifications, while the
traditional strict scrutiny standard would strike down virtually all clas0
sifications. "1
This observation is not meant to suggest that results would have
come easy regardless of the test employed."' There may indeed have
been found a principled difference between the forcible entry and detainer statute of the State of Oregon involved in Lindsey v. Normel and
the exclusionary land use controls in cases like Arlington, permitting
the Court to uphold the former but not the latter. As the Court noted
in Lindsey v. Normet the Oregon law there involved applied to all tenants: "Rich and poor, commercial and noncommercial."" ' 2 Restrictive land use controls are quite different, at least the case of those that
exclude the entire class of lower-income housing consumer, or the entire range of federal programs designed, by definition, to aid lower income persons to secure decent, safe and sanitary housing.
The restrictive route in view, the Court set out to pursue it, and did.
In Lindsey v. Normet the Court had obliquely noted that the range of
interests deemed constitutionally fundamental might not be subject to
evolution, '33 but that, unlike certain constitutional protections,' 1 4 fun106. Id. at 74.
107. See Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis, 240 U.S. 342 (1916). See generally, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
108. See note 105 supra.
109. See generally, Gunther, Foreword-In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing Court.'A
Aodelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972).
110. Cf.id. at 19.
II1. See id.
112. 405 U.S. at 56.
113. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
114. E.g. due process, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 499 citing approvingly Mr.
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542.43 (1961) in which he said the content
of due process was referenced to the tradition of the country and concluded: "that tradition is a
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damental rights, purportedly, were bound to a literal interpretation of
the Constitution's text. In short order, that intimation was clearly
stated in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez."5 The Court held
that fundamental rights for purposes of the equal protection clause are
not deduced from "comparisons of the relative societal significance" of
the interest asserted, but must be "a right . . . explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution."' 6 Discovering what is "implicitly"
guaranteed by the Constitution hardly promises to constitute a more
precise limitation on the Court's judgmental choices, necessary to every
judicial decision, than would be the much maligned notion that under
an evolving standard the Court could "pick out particular human activities, characterize them as 'fundamental,' and give them added protection.""' 7 It is doubtful that the Court's "tied-to-the-Constitution"
standard is any more promising as a control on judicial judgments than
the one rejected. Moreover, the literalistic approach restricts the scope
of relevant inquiry to a particular Justice's interpretation of what is
"implicitly" protected by the Constitution-a matter not subject to empirical constraint. The Court's approach does not promise greater success in the concededly praiseworthy pursuit of principled
decisionmaking standards. Regrettably, it acutely restricts relevant decisional factors since it excludes all those considerations which might
be instructive, but which are founded upon society's contemporary values.
In addition to rigidifying" 8 the equal protection analysis, Rodriguez
went a further distance down the restrictive route. It established that
only distinctions based on impecunity and, apparently, resulting in total deprivation of a benefit triggered the "suspect classification" test,
but that graduated economic status distinctions, presumably without
regard to the magnitude or relative degree of deprivation attendant to
them, do not trigger rigorous scrutiny." 9
Thus, what Valtierra, on analysis, had suggested, 20 Rodriguez confirmed: governmental actions which impact more heavily on a
relatively deprived economic class do not require more than a rational
basis in justification. This confirmation, thus, had implications for
Arlington -type cases, and foretold the likely futility of seeking to invalidate, on constitutional grounds, ordinances which by their operation
living thing;" and the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) ("evolving standards of decency").
115. 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
116. Id. at 33.
117. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969).
118. This is the characterization Mr. Justice Marshall put on the Court's approach. 411 U.S.
at 98 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
119. Id. at 18-29.
120. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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would exclude the lower economic class unable to afford, for example,
single family homes in localities restricted to single family homes, or
unable to demand available housing without the benefit of housing
subsidies (in some form) in localities that refused to participate in federal programs of housing assistance.
Having established a doctrinal predeliction to a restrictive course, the
Court next set about closing its doors to a large part of the class of
persons who might seek to enter the adjudicational portal. That case
was Warth v. Se/din 2' in which the Court held that none of several
classes of plaintiffs had standing to complain of alleged purposeful exclusion by economic class-a class in which racial minorities were disproportionately represented. As to persons who alleged their effective
exclusion by the conduct complained of the Court found no "injury in
fact," apparently because these persons could not show that a decision
in their favor would produce housing for them. An association of
builders was denied standing because the Court found that it suffered
no injury to itself by the conduct complained of, although it had sought
and been denied permits to build houses in the cost range the individual plaintiffs sought to have constructed. The Court's door closing efforts prompted Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and White
to say: "In effect, the Court tells the low-income-minority and building
company plaintiffs they will not be permitted to prove what they have
alleged--that they could and would build and live in the town if
changes were made in the zoning ordinance and its application-because they have not succeeded in breaching, before the suit
was filed, the very barriers which are the subject of the suit."12' 2
4. A Critical Constitutional Synthesis
Finally, Washington v. Davis'2 3 further restricted the scope of equal
protection, and the Court's potential role in the suburban exclusion
area, by adopting a purpose or intent threshold for determining discrimination. In so doing, the Court disapproved lower Court cases
which, it conceded, "impressively demonstrate that there is another
side to the issue"' 24 and, in exclusive reliance on cases which did not
present discrimination threshold issues, disapproved an "effects" test.
In the cases, to be discussed, upon which Washington v. Davis relies,
all the Court had decided was that the threshold for discrimination had
been crossed in instances where the evidence showed "intent," or "pur121.
122.
123.
124.

422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Id. at 523.
Supra note 50.
Id. at 245.
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pose and effect."' 125 However, not until Washington v. Davis was the
Court called on to demarcate the minimum threshold showing required. Thus, the Court could have consistently held that a showing of
a racially disproportionate impact established the minimum requirement for a prima facie violation of the equal protection clause. Mr.
Justice White's opinion, which purports to demonstrate the contrary,
will not withstand analysis.
The reference to the cases dealing with the exclusion of blacks from
juries 126 is not apt. The substance of the constitutional right in the jury
cases is a right in a black person (and others) not to be tried by a jury
from which blacks have been purposefully or deliberately excluded, but
there is no right to a jury containing blacks in a particular case.' 27 The
very referent in jury cases for determining whether purposeful exclusion has occurred is the population of the relevant geographic unit
from which the jury is drawn. 128 Accordingly, it may be assumed that
blacks in random proportion to their eligibility in the population will
be called for jury duty. Any particular person would this have a
case of a jury including all relevant groups in the
chance in a particular
29
population.
Accordingly, there is no way an effects test could ever arise in the
jury cases. Afortiori such a test could not have been precluded by the
jury cases. The jury cases therefore, in searching for evidence to show
purposeful or systematic exclusion, can hardly be authority for mandating an intent or purpose test when the issue is whether the imposition of burdens on blacks in employment or housing violates the equal
protection clause.
Of course, a jury selection method which would have the effect of
excluding blacks would be probative, perhaps, as to whether the purpose for adopting the selection method was to exclude blacks. But
there could be no issue as to whether a constitutional violation was
made out by the effect alone in light of the nature of the constitutional
right in the jury cases.
At least the jury cases did not compel the view that purpose or intent
is required to make out a violation when the measure of the injury is
the effect the challenged action has. Thus in exclusionary zoning cases
it is possible that there could be a constitutional violation when no intent to exclude is present. A constitutional injury in the jury cases is
125. See text accompanying notes 126-136 infra.
126. See cases cited by the Court, 426 U.S. at 241, 242.
127. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965).
128. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1879).
129. Distinguish the question of what degree of disparity between representation on juries and
representation in the relevant population it is necessary to show to prove purposeful or deliberate
exclusion of persons from jury service.
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not possible without intent or purpose to exclude, because only purposeful exclusion is subject to the constitutional prohibition.
The school desegregation cases, apart from Keyes, simply do not
raise the issue of discrimination thresholds, as discussed earlier. 3 0 It is
therefore very difficult to see how they could do any more than confirm
that the issue was open. It is true that in Keyes the Court pointed out
that dejure segregation requires purpose or intent.'
But finding de
jure segregation present, the Court had no occasion to consider defacto
32
segregation which would have involved discrimination thresholds.'
One of the voting boundaries cases, Gomillion v. Lightfoot,13 3 clearly
raised no issue of discrimination thresholds. As to Gomillion, Mr. Justice Stevens rightly pointed out in Washington v. Davis that with facts
showing disproportion as dramatic as was present there, it really would
make no difference what the standard for discrimination thresholds
was."' This analysis means that the facts so clearly established intent
or purpose that the threshold was clearly crossed and did not need to be
developed. This being so, the cases are hardly authority for much
more than the proposition that when intent or purpose to discriminate
is shown a prima facie case of an equal protection violation is made
out. It does not necessarily follow that failure to show intent or purpose cannot make out a case. Thus the cases relied upon cannot be
authority for requiring purpose or intent to establish a prima facie violation.
That leaves Wright v. Rockefeller. 13 Arguably, in Wright, the facts
made out simply did not show that the claimed irregularities resulted
other than fortuitously and thus were so far short of any minimum
130. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
131. 413 U.S. at 205, 208.
132. Id. at 206-07.
133. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In Gomillion Plaintiffs claimed that the Alabama State Legislature
had reshaped a city's boundaries so as to eliminate 99% of its black voters. The Supreme Court
reversed the District Court's dismissal, finding that the allegations, if proven, would establish the
Act's "inevitable effect" of depriving blacks of their municipal franchise on account of race, contrary to the Fifteenth Amendment. The Court held that a state's power to alter its political subdivisions is not insulated from federal judicial review when that State power is being used as an
instrument to circumvent Fifteenth Amendment voting rights through affirmative legislative action.
134. 413 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J. concurring).

pointed out. Id.

The same was true of Yick Wo which he also

It can be argued that like Yick Wo and in contradiction to the Court's state-

ment that it had not embraced an "effects test," Gomihlion analytically does employ an "effects"
test. See note 61 supra.

135. 376 U.S. 52 (1964). In Wright the District Court sustained the New York State Legislature's reapportionment of four congressional districts which diminished black and Puerto Rican
voting strength in three districts by concentrating it in the fourth. The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that where there are several plausible conflicting inferences, evidence of racial considerations cannot be elevated to prima facie proof that the Legislature was either motivated by racial
considerations or in fact drew the districts on racial lines. What must be shown is that such a
change is the "product of a state contrivance to segregate."
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threshold which might be established that the determination of where
the threshold lay could be avoided.1 36 Moreover, the drawing of lines
in Wright did not place burdens on anyone nor remove anyone from
participation, as it did in Gomillion, nor restrict privileges, as the challenged action did in Yick Wo. The lines simply changed the district in
which voting participation would take place, but did not affect the right
to participate. It is at least difficult to maintain that Wright compels
the proposition that action which does impose burdens (like zoning
which precludes housing for lower economic classes) or which does impose restrictions (like zoning or land use controls with racially discriminatory effects) will be sustained so long as the restrictions or burdens
are not imposed with a racial purpose or intent.
The Washington v. Davis analysis is inadequate from several perspectives. It purports to demonstrate that the result was precedentially
compelled. But the force of the cases relied on was considerably less
than that. Indeed the Court initially stated: "[Olur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional
solely because it has a racially discriminatory impact."' 3 7 That the
Court had not "embraced" an effects test, when it was unnecessary to
address that issue directly in prior cases, did not justify the Court's failure to analyze independently the issue of whether an "effects" or the
more restrictive "intent or purpose" test best effectuated the "central
purpose"' 138 of the equal protection clause. The cases plainly had
never settled the issue of whether a state's knowing use of official criteria which would inevitably produce adverse consequences to anidentified population segment constituted a violation of equal protection.
The second inadequacy of the intent test is the Court's failure to analyze the consequences of its "intent or purpose" test for suburban exclusion issues in light of the relevant history of the "central purpose" of
the equal protection clause. While such an analysis might not have
proved dispositive in either direction, 139 the Court, nevertheless, ought
to have undertaken a more critical approach in its decision, 4° espe136. This is exactly the reverse of Yick Wo and Gomillion.
137. 413 U.S. at 239.
138. Id.
139. Cf Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 75
(1917).
140. The Court's analysis is highly one-sided. The Court speculates, in a rather abstract manner, as to the potentially fa" reaching consequences of an effects test. 413 U.S. at 247, 248. It
does not even engage in speculation as to the potentially "far reaching" consequences of its intent
and purpose test.
Suffice it to say that the numerous lower courts employing an effects test had not been swayed
by the "parade of horribles," id. at 244, n.12, that the Court worries over. Id. at 24748.
On its facts Washington v. Davis could have had very little impact outside the plaintiffs involved
and some number, perhaps, similarly situated. Initiated in 1970, the Washington v. Davis plain-
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cially since, as previously noted,' 4 ' it recognized that there was an impressive demonstration that there existed "another side to the issue."
The third inadequacy of the intent test is that the Court underestimates the difficulty of ascertaining the intent or purpose of official action. This determination deals with the subjective area of motivation,
and will, presumably, require ascertaining that the "bad" motivation in
fact influenced the official action. This determination will render all
but the most egregious non-facial classification cases extremely difficult to prove. The risks of failure of proof will be borne by litigants
challenging sophisticated and subtle official action with discriminatory
effects. The Supreme Court, having restricted the Constitution to
comparatively easy cases, is not going to have a positive role in suburban exclusion cases.
The fourth problem presented by the subjective intent test relates to
the standard of proof for using objective criteria to raise inferences of
subjective motive. The Court in Washington v. Davis recognized this
point: "Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant [objective?] facts, including the
fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another."' 4 2 In Arlington the Court either missed this point, or applied it
in a way that makes it meaningless. Having reviewed the evidence, the
Court admitted that "[tihe impact of the Village's decision does arguably fall more heavily on racial minorities."' 4 3 Going on to cite, inter
alia, the Village's commitment to single family homes as its dominant
residential land use; the rejection of the rezoning request "according to
the usual procedures"; and "statements" of the decisionmakers which
44
focused "almost exclusively on the zoning aspects" of the request,'
the Court held that the plaintiffs "simply failed to carry their burden of
proving that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's decision."' 145
tiffs were not covered by the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which
brought public employment under its coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. II, 1972), amending
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
141. 426 U.S. at 245.
142. 413 U.S. at 242.
143. 429 U.S. at 266.
144. Id. at 269-70.
145. Id. at 270. In a footnote, the Court's further explication of the holding is even more
troublesome. The Court explained that even if "discrimination" had been shown to be "a motivating factor," that would only have shifted the burden to the Village to prove that the same
decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered. In theory
that is perhaps sound causation law. Eg. Tennessee Trailways, Inc. v. Ervin, 222 Tenn. 523, 438
S.W.2d 733 (1969) (Driving in excess of lawful speed limit is not cause-in-fact of accident when
accident would have occurred even if defendant had not been speeding). But separating out
causes in the subjective intent area of the motivation of a local government is quite unlike an
automobile case, and the Court should recognize the practically insurmountable barrier the "causation" test will be in the realm of suburban exclusion litigation. There will likely be multiple
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Unusualness of procedures may be revealing of motive; the contrary,
however, does not necessarily follow. The expectation that statements
of decisionmakers would reveal racially discriminatory motive in a case
of sophisticated, subtle official action to any significant degree, is so
unrealistic as to warrant no further comment. To turn a case on such
an expectation, or to premise results on the dunderheadedness of local
officials hardly makes for a sound constitutional approach.
That leaves the commitment to single family land uses to be considered. It must be emphasized that generally the law does not countenance failures of proof of intent, simply because of a plaintiff's inability
to demonstrate subjective intent. In other areas the rule has been developed that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of
his conscious conduct."4 If constitutional litigation requires a different rule for proving intent, the Court at least should recognize an obligation to explain why. The Court did not do that in either Washington
v. Davis or Arlington.
The fifth significant problem with the intent test is that as applied in
Arlington it flies in the face of common sense and documented empirical facts. The existence of racial discrimination in suburban housing is
so well-documented 47 that the Court would probably be justified in
taking judicial notice of that general phenomenon. 4 8 Given that generally in the law a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his conduct, and given that the natural and
probable, indeed the inevitable, consequence of restrictive zoning and
land use is to effect the exclusion of black persons and lower-income
classes, the reasoning of the Arlington decision is unconvincing, and the
result borders on the incredible.'4 9
motivation in every case of land use actions challenged as discriminatory. The multiple motivation problem will likely preclude any realistic attempt to isolate the impact of the improper motivation.
146. E.g., J. MICHAEL & H. WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 189 (1940)
(criminal intent); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, 31-32 (4th ed. 1971) (tortious intent);
N.L.R.B. v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963) (labor law); Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S.
167, 187 (1961) (civil rights statute).
147. Official government reports, e.g., U.S. CIvIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING (1975) and EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA
(1974); REPORT, NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 115-20 (1968) and scholarly
discussion, see generally Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision.- Expanding the Boundaries of Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1 (1976), of the phenomenon surely attests its well-known and welldocumented character.
148. See generally, C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 331 (2d ed. 1972). This observation is not
intended to suggest that judicial notice should be taken of general discrimination to make out a
case of discrimination in a particular case. Rather that the Court should not have ignored the
general problem in formulating and applying rules governing proof of discrimination in land use
cases challenging land use practices as exclusionary along racial lines.
149. One is inclined to observe that everybody would understand that more likely than not the
Arlingtons of this country intended by their land use practices to exclude black and poor people,
except the Supreme Court! In a different context the Court itself has stated: "All others see and
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In attempting to round out a discussion of the litigation potential of
constitutional doctrine, whether against a backdrop of doctrines as they
have been developed or as they might have been, selected other issues
and problems ought to be touched upon.
Even if Arlington had gone the other way, the equal protection analysis would still have reached only racial classifications as a meaningful
doctrinal tool to deal with suburban exclusion.' 5 ° The consequence
would be that, persumably the exclusion of poor persons, as distinguished from racial minorities, from suburbia, in itself, would not raise
a significant constitutional issue. True, the interests of poor white persons might be caught up in the remedial sweep of racial exclusion litigation. Poor white persons would then get incidental, but not direct
relief. In truth, the possibility of blacks having rights poor white persons do not have, cannot sit well doctrinally, and would surely exacerbate already existing ill-will between blacks and whites.
Whether the "right to travel" doctrine, which some commentators
see as developing,' would prove effective, if developed, is doubtful.
not doctrinally taiThat doctrine contains procedural snares, and is 152
lored to address the suburban exclusion problem.
Other doctrines, developed exclusively in the land use control area,
are in an ascent stage at best.' 53 Often the cases arise in disparate state
forums, and raise state law issues under varieties of state statutes and
doctrines, with the prospect of non-uniformity of method and result.
Zoning cases which address the suburban exclusion issue do so frequently at the instance of parties whose interests do not coincide with
those of suburban inclusion advocates, and infrequently in the context
of federal housing and development policies and programs. 154 In any
understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?" The Child Labor Tax Case, 259
U.S. 20, 37 (1922).

To reach the Arlington result the Court had to adopt the following syllogism:

(1) Arlington adopted a restrictive land use practice.
(2) Restrictive land use practices have an inevitable tendency to exclude black and poor
people.
(3) In adopting a restrictive land use practice Arlington did not intend to exclude black and
poor people.
The working out of this syllogism in a way that avoids the exclusion of black and poor people is
the lynchpin of the proposal made in Part II infra.
150. The principal reason is that relative wealth classifications do not trigger strict scrutiny,
see text accompanying notes 118-120 supra.
151. Eg. Comment, The Right to Travel"Another ConstitutionalStandard/orLocal Land Use
Regulations?, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 612 (1972); Comment, Travel- The Evolution ofa Penumbral
Right, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 84 (1973); Note, Freedom of Travel and Exclusionary Land Use
Regulations, 84 YALE L.J. 1564 (1975).
152. See Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,424
U.S. 934 (1976) (discussing problems ofjurisdiction, jurisdictional amount and standing of parties

to raise particular issues or represent particular interests).
153. See generally, Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision. Expanding the BoundariesofZoning Re/orm, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
154. See e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapd, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972);
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event the problem is national in scope and effect. It demands national
answers.
Thus, even if the Court were to adopt a broader view of the constitutional predicate, it must be acknowledged that the constitutional analysis would not be perfectly suited to addressing the suburban inclusion
problem in its broader contexts.
C. The Problem of NationalLegislative Policy. Tentative, Conflicting
andAbsent
1. Overview of Statutory Dimensions
To look at America's national housing policy is to see a crazy quilt.
It has patches that neither fit nor match, is frayed all around the edges,
and has big holes throughout. Such a quilt could hardly provide
warmth or comfort. Similarly, one could not reasonably expect pursuit
of America's housing policy to yield "a decent home in a suitable living
environment for all American families."' 5 This phrase-more than a
quarter century old-is bold in its promise, yet feeble in its product.
The confused origins of our housing policy, the conflicts that pervade
it, and the ineffectiveness of the methods and tools for implementing it
have been analyzed elsewhere.' 56
Before going to a discussion of the specific legislative guidance and
clarification needed, it is necessary to examine two legislative areas
which might be thought relevant to the suburban exclusion/inclusion
problem. These statutory areas are the relevant civil rights and housing laws. This examination will outline the failure of these laws to
mandate an effective prohibition of suburban exclusion, as well as their
failure to mandate an effective prohibition of suburban exclusion, as
well as their failure to mandate suburban inclusion. I will also examine the failure of current laws to provide adequate, or even practically useful, enforcement tools.
2.

The Civil Rights Legislation: Of Gaps and Uncertainties

In Arlington, after finding that no constitutional provision was violated by the land use practices challenged as racially exclusionary, the
Supreme Court remanded the case to the circuit court for a determination of whether Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968157 was
Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1972).
155. The goal Congress set in 1949. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (1969).
156.

See generally Daye, Role ofthe Judiciary in Community Development and Housing: A Sug-

gestedAnalyticalMethod, 52 J. Us. L. 689, 693-99 (1975).
157. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601 et seq. (1973).
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violated.' 5 8 Since the Supreme Court held that purpose or intent to
discriminate is required to show a constitutional violation and that the
facts, as the Court viewed the evidence, would not support a finding of
purpose or intent, for constitutional purposes, two issues remain for the
circuit court. One is whether assuming "intent or purpose" is required by Title VIII, a finding of such may be predicated upon evidence which is insufficient to support such a finding under the equal
protection clause. The other issue is whether Title VIII dispenses with
a need to show purpose or intent, and permits violations to be shown in
certain circumstances,
by "discriminatory effect" or "disproportionate
159
impact."'
The basic provision of Title VIII dealing with the sale or rental of
housing is § 804.60 Subsection (a) of § 804, which seems most pertinent to the suburban exclusion issue, if any part of § 804 ,may be
thought to be applicable, provides, with non-material exceptions, that:
"[I]t shall be unlawful-(a) to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling 6to
any person because
1
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin."'
This provision appears to apply to a housing provider. Generally
local governments are not builders or developers of housing of any
kind. Accordingly, the language of § 804(a) which makes unlawful
actions which "otherwise make unavailable" dwellings to persons because of their race, seems to be the only provision of § 804 which would
be applicable to local suburban governments in suits claiming exclusionary land use practices. It takes a bit of interpreting to reach suburban exclusion under § 804(a), however, because the language speaking
of a refusal to "sell or rent" after bona fide offers, and refusal "to negotiate" for sale or rental, can only apply to an entity which directly provides housing. Thus the eusdem generis maxim of statutory
construction would at least suggest as not unreasonable an interpretation of the catchall phrase--"otherwise make unavailable or deny"-as
162
being limited to subject matter of the same genus as to "sell or rent."
Of course maxims are hardly dispositive, and cannot be used to thwart
"the obvious purpose of legislation."1 6 1 Whether applicability to sub158. 429 U.S. at 271.
159. Put differently, the issue is whether Title VIII creates the same differential test for housing discrimination when juxtaposed with the equal protection clause, as Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
2000e et seq. (1974), creates in the employment discrimination area vis-a-vis the equal protection
clause. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) with Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
160. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604 (1973).
161. Id. § 3604(2).
162. See e.g., United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 682 (1950).
163. See e.g., Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
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urban local government land use practices is "an obvious purpose" of §
804, or Title VIII in whole, is a matter to be inquired into at a later
point. 64
The other arguably relevant provision of Title VIII is § 817,165
which, in pertinent part, provides that:
'It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with
any person in the exercise' 66
or enjoyment of ... any right granted or
protected by [Title VIII].'
The terms "coerce", "intimidate" or "threaten" connote active conduct,
apparently directed toward a specific individual, of an unfriendly or
belligerant nature. It would take a stretch of the common understanding of these terms to make them applicable to a suburban local government's adoption of land use controls which, by their operation, exclude
a class of persons, but no particularly specified individual, because of
race. A reasonable argument could be made that such controls would
"interfere" with the exercise of fair housing rights if they precluded
housing that would be available to racial minorities, but since "interfere" is one term of four descriptive terms prohibiting certain conduct,
the eiusdem generis problem arises again. Does "interfere" prohibit
conduct of the same genus as "coerce", "intimidate," and "threaten"?
Without attempting a definitive answer, it is sufficient to point out, that
the applicability of Title VIII's most pertinent provisions to suburban
exclusion is far from indisputable.
But even assuming a Title VIII prohibition of exclusionary practices,
would that constitute a mandate for a court's requiring inclusionary
practices? At a bare minimum it must be noted, for example, that an
injunction requiring the issuance of a building permit for a particular
development would not be the same thing as a general requirement
compelling the local government to make a reasonable provision for
67
housing which would be available to members of racial minorities.1
This last point calls attention to another provision of Title VIII
which authorizes the United States' Attorney General to sue to enjoin
"a pattern or practice" of resistance to the full enjoyment of rights
granted by Title VIII.' 61 This provision, assuming the applicability of
Title VIII to suburban exclusion, 69 authorizes a civil action seeking
such relief as the Attorney General deems necessary "to insure the full
enjoyment of the rights granted" under Title VIII. 70 Arguably, as a
164. See text accompanying notes 176-185 infra.
165. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3617 (1973).
166.

Id.

167.
168.
169.
170.

Compare discussion of the proposed act in text accompanying notes 264-267 infra.
42 U.S.C.A. § 3613 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 176-185 infra.
See text accompanying notes 171-175 iafra.
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remedy to an adjudicated pattern or practice in violation of Title VIII,
an order could be formulated under § 813 requiring a plan for housing
which would be available to persons injured by the violation. That is
theoretically an available course, which is not to say either that the
Attorney General would seek such relief, or that a court would be compelled to grant it, or, if not compelled, would be disposed to do so.
There are numerous shortcomings, however, given even the most expansive interpretations of the scope of Title VIII, and its remedial possibilities. Damages to the aggrieved party would be next to no remedy
at all,' 7 1 particularly if the aggrieved party is the person excluded by
the land use practice. Indeed that person, as a particular individual,
may be unidentified and unidentifiable. The group injured, if it be
identifiable in general, may not be identifiable for the purpose of
awarding damages, and moreover, the nature of the injury is not readily susceptible of quantification. In suburban exclusion litigation,
therefore, damages may be so speculative in their very nature that few,
if any courts would find proof of damages acceptable in the vast majority of cases.
Injunctions, especially those by federal courts against political action
locally mandated, create their own problems of enforcement and supervision. In most instances broad based judicial relief has not proved
72
effective against broad based housing discrimination problems.'
There are few reasons to be optimistic, and many reasons to be doubt173
ful, about the prospects of judicial relief for suburban exclusion.
The primary problem is that injunctive relief, with merely the prospect
of contempt citations as enforcement sanctions, provides minimal incentive to good faith compliance, (particularly when local political
pressure is in the opposite direction), but maximum incentive to footdragging and dilatory tactics. Courts are likely to get embroiled in
specifying compliance details and in implementing relief on a continuing basis. These are tasks Courts are not effectively organized to han74
dle.'
Frequently suburban exclusion works to exclude on the basis of both
race and economic class. Even expansively interpreted and applied
Title VIII would reach economic exclusion only to the extent that mi171. But see, Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and LegalAnalis, 86 YALE
L.J. 385 (1977).
172. See generally, Ronfeldt & Clifford, Judicial Enforcement ofthe Housingand Urban Development Acts, 21 HASTINGS L.J.317 (1970); Comment, The Limits of Litigation:PublicHousing Site
Selection and the Failure ofInjunctive Relief, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1330 (1974); Note, The Inadequacy ofJudcialRemedies in Cases ofExclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L. REv. 760 (1976).
173. See generally, McGee, Illusion and Contradiction in the Quest for a Desegregated
Metropolis, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 984.
174. See generaly, Daye, Role of the Judiciary in Community Development and Housing- A
Suggested Analytical Method, 52 J. URB. L. 689, 716-45 (1975).

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1977

33

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1977], Art. 4

70

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

norities are over-represented in the lower economic group. Clearly Title VIII provides no remedy to general exclusion along economic lines,
and to that extent, at best, would be only a piecemeal solution to the
problem of suburban exclusion. Moreover, such a remedy would not
to the extent that inclusion is broader than
address suburban
75 inclusion
non-exclusion. 1
Still unresolved, however, is the extent to which Title VIII (a) applies
to suburban exclusion because of race or (b) requires a less difficult
threshold for showing discrimination than the equal proteciton clause
as interpreted in Arlington.
A search of the legislative history does not disclose any specific intention on the part of Congress, in enacting Title VIII, to address land
use actions by suburban local governments. 76 Representative McCulloch, a supporter of the open housing provisions and a member of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders noted a statement
in the Report of the Commission that:
Discrimination prevents access to many non-slum areas, particularly
the suburbs, where good housing exists. In addition, by creating a
'back pressure' in the racial ghettos, it makes it possible for landlords to
break up apartments for denser occupancy, and keeps prices and rents
ghetto housing higher than they would be in a truly free
of deteriorated
77
market. 1
Textually this statement was clearly a reference to private discrimination in the housing market affecting blacks with the economic wherewithal to purchase existing housing. The comment does not address
the unavailability of housing within the reach of economically disadvantaged persons which is caused by land use restrictions.' 7 8 This inconclusive bit of legislative history comes as close as any known which
might reveal that Congress intended to speak to suburban exclusion.
In the Senate where the open housing legislation originated, the late
Senator Robert Kennedy, speaking of the need for open housing legislation said:
175. See text accompanying notes 216-217 infra.
176. Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act does not have the usual legislative history-report

of committees in the Senate and the House, nor a Conference Committee Report--because of the

procedural quirks accompanying its enactment. See generally 2 B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HIsTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1629 (1970) [Hereinafter SCHWARTZ].
177. Id. at 1784.
178. The quoted statement follows a discussion of the inability of blacks in poverty to pay for
suitable housing, and is contained in a paragraph which distinguishes between economic inability
to purchase housing and inability from racial discrimination. (It may be noted that the quote
contains certain non-substantive variances from the statement in the Commission's Official report.
Compare, REPORT, supra note 9, at 259. Nevertheless, in the case of exclusionarylandusepractices
it is note generally possible to separate racial and economic exclusion, because in large measure
the racial effects arise out of economic impacts. Racial discrimination remains important in segregated housing patterns, however. Comment, The FederalFairHousingRequirements."Title VIII of
the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 1969 DUKE L.J. 733, 736 (1969).
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It is easy enough to recognize [the] need for more housing, particularly for low- and middle-income earners. The 5.7 million units of
substandard housing which now scar our land; the growing blight of
slums in our largest cities, unfit for human habitation; these are tangible signs of crisis.
Yet what of-those who have the power to escape? What of those
who have finally overcome the barriers of race and now earn enough
money to afford decent housing? The Civil Rights Commission found
last year:
"Even Negroes who can afford the housing in (the suburbs)
have been excluded by the racially discriminatory practices not
only of property owners themselves, but also of real estate brokers, builders, and the home finance industry."
These practices are as direct as a flat refusal to show property to a
Negro, and as insidious as the ploys of "not available" and "just
rented" which always afflict a buyer of the wrong race.
Negroes invariably find properties overpriced or unavailable for inspection, or, if they manage to overcome these barriers, they find hostility from brokers, rejection from financers, and resentment from
prospective neighbors. 79
Senator Kennedy's statement is as expansive as any which research has
revealed. He referred to four instances of discrimination in the suburbs-that by private property owners, real estate brokers, builders,
and the home fimance industry. Conspicuous in its absence is any reference to exclusionary zoning as an instance of suburban discrimination.
Congress in considering the open housing legislation was consumed
with the issues of undue restriction on rights of private property owners
to alienate their property, 80 the exclusion of Mrs. Murphy's rental
housing, ' anti-riot legislation,'8 2 a filibuster in the Senate, 8 3 and procedural objections in the House.' 8 Thus the very real likelihood is
the issue of exthat the full Congress never gave real consideration8 to
5
clusionary zoning when it was enacting Title VIII.1
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

SCHWARTZ, supra note 176, at 1679.
See id. at 1682-90.; 1709-16; 1757-61 and 1780-81.
Id.at 1692, 1741-44.
Id. at 1668-70; 1674-76, 1697-1709.
Id. at 1754-57.
Id.at 1770-85, 1792-98.

185. Nineteen sixty-eight was not the frst time Congress considered open housing legislation.
In 1966 the House passed a Civil Rights Act with many features of the 1968 Act. The Senate did
not pass the 1966 Act. Id. at 1630. In 1967 a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency held hearings on several housing related proposals. Dubofsky, Fair Housing.- A
Legislative History and Perspective, 8 WAsHBURN L.J. 149, 150 (1969).

These hearings were at-

tended by Senator Proxmire, among others. However, the subcommittee did not report out any
bill. Id. However, at the hearings Senator Proxmire raised the question of exclusionary zoning.
Hearings on S 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Relating to Civil Rights and Housing Before the Subcomni. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm on Banking and Finance, 90th Cong.,
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But the mere fact that Congress did not address the specific problem,
insofar as legislative history is instructive, does not mean that later
manifestations of the same sorts of problems Congress did address are
necessarily unreachable by the legislation. Problems, though not specifically identified, may nevertheless be within the ambit of the statute
if they fall within the language Congress employed, create the same
conditions Congress was attempting to alleviate, and are within generic
classes similar to those Congress specifically defined. Suburban exclusion presumably could be interpreted to fall within the broad outlines
of such remedial legislation and as falling within the spirit of the legislation.
It may reasonably be argued, broadly, that the enactment of land use
controls which have the effect of precluding all types of housing which
would be occupied by a significant number of members of racial minorities thus maintaining a virtually all-white suburb, could be thought
to be action which "otherwise make[s] unavailable or den[ies] a dwellwith
ing to any person because of race," or as action which "interferes"
86
opportunity.1
housing
equal
of
enjoyment
the
in
persons
Getting over that hurdle would raise another one. Is action which
has "the effect" of excluding minorities within the prohibitions of Title
VIII? The language of the act--"because of race"-is probably not
dispositive, and the legislative history, as discussed above, is not revealing on the issue.
The third problem is determining the evidentiary standard necessary
to prove a case, under whatever test is applicable. Does a primafacie
case which shows either "effects" or "intent or purpose" (whichever is
applicable) shift the burden, and require the municipality to come forward with justification? If so, must the justification show compelling
circumstances, or meet some less rigorous standard? These questions
are not answered by the terms of the Act or its history.
1st Sess. (1967). Senator Proxmire worried over "a successful attempt on the part of suburbs to
exclude minority groups and poor people, zoning ordinances of various kinds and various other
restrictions." He then expressed interest in a provision that would prohibit federal grants or loans
administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development from going to "any jurisdiction within which an adequate amount of decent housing" is not available for low-and-moderate income persons "by reason of restrictions in zoning ordinances or building codes or other
factors." Id. at 73. Although Senator Proxmire continued to press various witnesses about his
proposal during the hearings, id. at 74, 176, 178, 217, 364, 390-91, as noted, no bill was reported
out. Dubofsky, supra.
Senator Proxmire's awareness of exclusionary zoning issues was probably greater than that of
the Congress at large. Indeed his discussion anticipated the leading legal literature on the subject
by almost two years. Eg., Sager, Tight Little Islands.-ExclusionaryZoning, EqualProtection, and
the Indigent, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 767 (1969); Aloi, Goldberg, & White, RacialandEconomic Segregation by Zoning.-Death Knellfor Home Rule?, I U. Toledo L. Rev. 65 (1969).
Moreover there is some indication at least that some members of Congress have doubts about
whether Title ViII reaches suburban exclusionary zoning. See note 255 infra.
186. See text accompanying notes 160-175 supra.
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In sum, for private parties to have the best chance of prevailing
under Title VIII in a case of suburban exclusion, the following interpretations would be neccessary:
(1) discriminatory suburban local land use practices are covered by
the prohibitions of the Act,
(2) land use practices are discriminatory if they have the effect of excluding minorities, or alternatively, disproportionately exclude or
burden minorities, and
(3) proof of discriminatory effects or disproportionate impact shifts
the burden to the municipality to demonstrate that its actions were
necessary to promote a compelling (and permissible) interest.
This interpretation of Title VIII was very nearly reached by the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. City of Black Jack,I" 7 in which the
United States Attorney General sued the City alleging that its land use
actions violated Title VIII. It does not readily appear that the interpretation of § 3604(a)"'8 or § 3617189 would vary depending on whether
the plaintiff were a private person or the Government, although under
§ 3613 the Attorney General is specifically authorized to bring an action to enforce the provisions of Title VIII.' 9 ° The complaint alleged
that the City of Black Jack had denied housing on the basis of race and
had interfered with the exercise of equal housing opportunity by adopting an ordinance which by prohibiting the construction of any new
multi-family dwellings, thereby precluded the construction of a low-tomoderate income townhouse complex of 108 units which would be occupied, at least in part, by blacks. But the facts clearly showed action
directed toward a specific project, after it was well into the planning
stages, and a change under the ordinance from a multifamily site to a
classification which prohibited any such dwellings. The facts revealed
a highly suspicious chain of events: After the sponsors of the development had selected a site suitably zoned in an unincorporated area of St.
Louis County, and were issued a "feasibility letter" which made federal
funding available, residents of the area started a successful drive to incorporate the area as a municipality. Shortly after incorporation the
municipality enacted the zoning ordinance.
Although the court purported to place its decision on more expansive
grounds, it must be noted that the government claimed that the ordinance had been enacted "for the purpose of excluding blacks" and the
court agreed that there was "evidence in the record to sport that con92
Since the Supreme Court declined to review the case,
tention."''
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(a)(1973).
Id § 3617.
Id § 3613.
508 F.2d at 1185 n. 3.
422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
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the issues it decided are open at the ultimate level.' 93 Moreover, the
decision appears to have been decided on grounds broader than required. This diminishes the force of the opinion, since in strict terms,
the broader rationale of the decision is dictum. Other factors also diminish the strength of Black Jack.
The Black Jack court appears to reason by analogy to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Title VII's employment provisions in Griggs v.
Duke Power194 to find an equal scope for Title VIII. Title VIII may
well be as broad as Title VII, but the two acts were enacted at different
times by different Congresses.195 That the later act is as broad as the
earlier one does not seem automatically to follow. Nor does the Black
Jack court explain its reasoning with the fullness that would give its
conclusion the persuasive force it might otherwise have.
At the crucial point of its decision dealing with whether Title VIII
permits an "effects" test or requires a showing of "purpose or intent",
the Black Jack court, as a substitute for independent reasoning, relies
on lower court cases as authority for an "effects" test. Perhaps this is
justifiable since an "impressive number" of lower courts had reached
that conclusion.' 96 But exactly this same situation had obtained with
respect to discrimination thresholds under the equal protection clause,
and the Supreme Court, in a footnote,'9 7 dispatched those decisions
(including three of the six cases relied upon in Black Jack) 98 as incorrect. However, disapproval of the cases insofar as they held that an
"effects" test was the constitutional touchstone does not necessarily
mean that their application of the test as a matter of statutory interpretation is equally invalid.
Having surmounted two of the three Title VIII hurdles, the Black
Jack court addressed the evidentiary standard required for the municipality to justify governmental actions shown to have an exclusionary
effect. Again without independent analysis, the court holds that in justification the city must demonstrate that its conduct "was necessary to
193. The denial of certiorari does not imply approval. A good exemplar in support of that
statement is the rather summary footnote disapproval of Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) by the Court in Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976), along with other cases in which certiorari had not
been sought, without noting any differences in the weight of the cases disapproved.
194. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

195. Title VII was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by the 88th Congress, while
Title VIII was part of the 1968 Civil Rights Act enacted by the 90th Congress.
196. See cases cited in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244, n. 12 (1976).
197. Id.
198. The discredited three are Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (en
banc); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970) cert.
denied,401 U.S. 1010 (1971) and Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d
920 (2d Cir. 1968).
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promote a compelling governmental interest."' 99 In a footnote the
Black Jack court noted that the "compelling interest" standard was
that applied in constitutional equal protection cases, but stated that
once aprimafaciecase of racially discriminatory effects was made out,
"[i]t became proper to apply" the same test.2 "° That is hardly persuasive reasoning. 2°
Nevertheless, as persuasively pointed out by Professor McGee, the
Supreme Court may be giving a more generous and expansive interpretation to statutes bearing on racial discrimination than it is willing to
give the Constitution.2 0 2 In support of this observation, one might
contrast the statutory approach of the Court in Title VII cases as evidenced by Griggs with the constitutional approach in Washington v.
Davis. It is possible that Black Jack may be vindicated when the
Supreme Court reaches the issues. But based on the language and the
legislative history of Title VIII, it cannot be concluded that the Black
Jack Court's vindication is anything like assured.
In Arlington, on remand,20 3 the Seventh Circuit had to determine
whether in the absence of proof of intent to discriminate for constitutional purposes, plaintiffs could nevertheless make out a case that Village's refusal to rezone violated Title VIII. That court held that "if
there is no land other than plaintiff's property within Arlington Heights
which is both properly zoned and suitable for federally subsidized lowcost housing, the Village's refusal to rezone constituted a violation of
section 3604(a). ' 2 °4 It, in turn, remanded for a determination of
and held that the burden of
whether alternative suitable sites existed,
20 5
proof on that issue was on the Village.

To reach the conclusion that a refusal to rezone would violate Title
VIII if no other suitable sites existed, the opinion meandered through a
confusing and complex chain of reasoning that left significant problems
unresolved. First, the Court reaffirmed its earlier finding that the refusal to rezone "had a greater impact on black people than on white
199. 508 F.2d at 1185.
200. Id at n.4.
201. One question might be raised at this point. We now understand that the equal protection
clause requires the "purpose or intent" test. Justifications (at least in the case of race), presumably, would have to demonstrate compelling interests. "Purpose" and "intent" are at the rigorous
end of the proof spectrum. An "effects" test would appear to be toward the opposite end of that
spectrum. Should the justification standard move along the spectrum to the same point? If this
is so, a compelling interest test for justification purposes when the effects test is applicable is not at
the same point on the rigorousness spectrum.
202. McGee, Illusion and Contradiction in the Questfor a Desegregated Metropolis, 1976 U.
ILL. L.F. 948, 995-97, citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); and Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
203. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
204. Id. at 1294.
205. Id.
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people. ' ' 20 6 This finding was premised on the court's statement that "a
greater number of black people than white people in the Chicago metropolitan area satisfy the income requirements for federally subsidized
housing."2 7 As will be discussed shortly, at a later point in its analysis, the court, apparently, became confused about its statement.
Second, the court addressed the question of whether a refusal to rezone constituted action, under § 3604(a), which made a dwelling "unavailable because of race." The Court concluded that Title VIII
should be broadly construed, by analogy to the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in Griggs v. Luke Power Co.,2' and that so interpreted, Title VIII could reach a refusal to rezone, because the "natural
and foreseeable consequence of failure to rezone was to adversely affect black people seeking low-cost housing and to perpetuate segregation in Arlington Heights." 2'
Next, the court rejected plaintiffs argument that the showing of a
racially discriminatory effect necessarily established a violation of §
3604(a). It held, instead, that the determination of whether a discriminatory effect violated § 3604(a) required an analysis of four factors: (1)
the strength of the showing of discriminatory effect, (2) whether some
evidence of discriminatory intent was present, (3) the interest of the
Village in taking the action, and (4) the nature of the relief sought.2 10
Having already held that a racially discriminatory effect was created
by the refusal to rezone, it is not at all clear what function an analysis
of the "strength of the showing of discriminatory effect" serves. The
analysis additionally breaks down elsewhere. The Court found that
there are "two kinds of racially discriminatory effects which a racially
neutral decision about housing can produce": first, a greater adverse
impact on one racial group than another, or second, the perpetuation of
segregation which would prevent interracial association. 21 '
The court found the evidence of the first to be "relatively weak," and
then in what appears to be a contradiction of its original reason for
finding discriminatory effect for purposes of Title VIII, the court
stated:
It is true that the Village's refusal to rezone had an adverse impact on
a significantly greater percentage of the nonwhite people in the Chicago area than of the white people in that area. But is is also true that
the class disadvantaged by the Village's action was not predominantly
nonwhite, because sixty percent of the people in the Chicago area eligi206. Id. at 1288.
207. Id.

208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 1288-89.
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1290.
Id.
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212
ble for federal housing subsidization in 1970 were white.

This statement is difficult to reconcile with the earlier finding that "a
greater number of black people than white people in the Chicago metropolitan area satisfy the income requirements for federally subsidized
housing." It is probable that the court meant to conclude that a greater
percentage, not number, of blacks than whites would be affected. Indeed that seems to be the only way to reconcile the statements.
Respecting the second way an effect can come about, ie., whether
the refusal would perpetuate segregation in Arlington Heights, the
court found the record unclear. Since the record did not reveal
whether other suitable sites existed, the court remanded the case for
consideration of that factual question.213
Since the showing of disproportionate impact was "relatively weak"
and since no finding could be made on the perpetuation of segregation,
the Court's finding that a discriminatory effect was shown for purposes
of a Title VIII violation originally is hard to understand.
Next, the court discounted the importance of whether some evidence
of intent to discriminate existed, noting that, by hypothesis, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of intent. And the court
noted that the problems of relying on "partial evidence of intent" were
as troublesome as requiring proof of intent to make out a Title VIII
had already rejected as being an inappropriviolation, which the court
2 14
ate Title VIII standard.
Respecting the interest of the Village in refusing to rezone, the court
rendered the unhelpful conclusion that the power to zone was within
the Village's authority and that generally, municipalities are accorded
wide latitude in zoning.21 5
Finally the court addressed the nature of relief sought. Here the
court concluded that:
The courts ought to be more reluctant to grant relief when the plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to construct integrated housing or
take affirmative steps to ensure that integrated housing is built than
when the plaintiff is attempting to build integrated housing on his own
land and merely seeks to enjoin the defendant from interfering with
that construction. To require a defendant to appropriate money, utilize his land for a particular purpose, or take other affirmative steps
toward integrated housing is a massive judicial intrusion on private autonomy. By contrast, the courts are far more willing to prohibit even
nonintentional action by the state which interferes with an individual's
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

1291.
1291, 1294.
1292.
1293.
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2 16 plan to use his own land to provide integrated housing.
The court appears to be on defensible ground to the extent that it suggests that the granting of equitable relief after a violation is found is a
matter of discretion, and that in its exercise the court may consider
equitable factors and fashion relief accordingly.1 7 But the suggestion
that the nature of the relief requested is even relevant to whether a
statute has been violated is novel. The court appears to be badly confused in suggesting that the determination of whether Title VIII has
been violated by the conduct challenged is a matter addressed to the
court's discretion. Clearly the court was concerned about plaintiff's
argument that once a racially discriminatory effect is shown, a violation of § 804(a) is necessarily established. On this the court said:
We decline to extend the reach of the Fair Housing Act this far...
[We refuse to conclude that every action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal. Such a per se rule would go beyond the intent of
Congress and would lead courts into untenable results in specific cases

• . . Rather,the courts must use their discretionin deciding whether, given
the particular
circumstances of each case, relief should be grantedunder
18
the statute.2

But the step between the reach of the Act and the relief awarded is too
big a step. The step the court makes is that the courts should not find
that every discriminatory effect is prohibited by the Act, because courts
should use their discretion in granting relief. The step the court missed
or confused apparently was that not every discriminatory effect violates
the Act because Congress did not intend such a conclusion, but surely
not because courts have discretion whether to find a violation of the
statute.
The more appropriate analysis would seem to be that if Congress
could not have intended all discriminatory effects to violate the Act, it
must be that some reasons could justify such effects consistently with
Congressional intent. Upon such an analysis, a court could conclude
that a showing of discriminatory effects would make out aprimafacie
violation, but that aprimafacia case could then be rebutted by a showing of reasons Congress contemplated in justification of the effects.
Such an analysis would parallel the analysis of Title VII, as to which
disporportionate racial impact in the employment testing area will
make out a primafacie case, which may be rebutted by showing that
the test is job related.21 9
216. Id.
217. See generally, Daye, Role of the Judiciary in Community Development and Housing A
SuggestedAnalyticalMethod, 52 J. URB. L. 689 (1975).
218. 558 F.2d at 1290. (emphasis added).
219. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1971).
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Other problems with the court's analysis include its failure to take
into account very real timing problems as to the alternative sites. Must
such sites be reasonably available, at comparable prices, from owners
willing to sell, for the plaintiffs purposes, on plaintiffs timetable?
There may be a wide gap between theoretically available and practically available suitable alternative sites in view of the plaintiff s situation.
Given the vicissitudinal starts and stops of federal funding, long delays may surely render cases moot-a matter the plaintiffs must contend with on remand-and thus a powerful incentive is created for
municipal foot dragging and obstruction. The court's approach is
likely to create substantial obstacles for those proposing housing in
suburban areas even if the court's analysis ultimately prevails. Given
the deficiencies discussed, the prospect is considerably less than bright
that the court of appeals's opinion will prove to be the aid suburban
inclusion advocates both seek and desperately need.
3. The Housing Acts: Confusion in Evolution
In discussing housing policy, I have stated elsewhere that:
"[Slomething of a contradiction has been created. On the one hand,
numerous and substantial federal requirements and limitations exist
• . .which necessarily mandate significant federal control and policing.
On the other hand, the achievement of. . .goals in terms of initiative
and operational implementation has been thrust on local and state governments.""2 2 The problems courts encounter under the housing laws
in dealing with issues of suburban exclusion are currently demon22
strated by the recent case of City of Hartfordv. Town of Glastonbury. 1
The dispute arose under the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974 (the "HCD Act") and presents a perfect example of the
urban crisis battle because it touches on the issue of "opening up the
suburbs" through utilization of the housing acts.
The City of Hartford, several city officials of Hartford, and lowerincome individuals residing in Hartford sued the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). The plaintiffs sought to enjoin HUD from releasing to certain suburban jurisdictions in the
Hartford metropolitan area any community development revenue sharing funds for 1975 under the HCD Act. Plaintiffs complained that
HUD's determination to waive the requirement of the submission of
"expected to reside" (ETR) figures as part of the suburbs' applications
for community development funds was illegal. The district court is220. See Daye, supra note 217, at 698.
221. 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1976).
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sued the injunction.22 2 A Second Circuit panel affirmed,22 3 but on
rehearing en banc the panel was reversed with five judges joining in an
opinion directing dismissal of the complaint, with a sixth judge concurring in result, and four judges dissenting.22 4
The decision directing dismissal was based on the plaintiffs' lack of
standing, but demonstrably the rationale of the decision goes to the
very heart of housing policies. An examination of the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions is instructive about how unclear and
inadequate legislative guidance invites confusion. The case demonstrates additionally that such inadequate guidance also invited administrative indecision, or perhaps, bungling. A brief discussion of the
HCD Act, and an analysis of the policy evolution the Act brought
about, may aid putting the Hartford conflict in its proper context.
In the HCD Act Congress made several findings directly related to
suburban exclusion problems, and inferentially based the declaration
of the Act's purposes on its findings. Congress found, among other
things, that critical social and economic problems arose from "the concentration of persons of lower income in central cities, '22 5 and that the
welfare of the nation and the well-being of its citizens require systematic and sustained action by Federal, State and local governments "to
improve the living environment of low- and moderate-income families. .. ."226 Congress did not stop at that, however, but went on to
add that one of its specific objectives in providing community development money to local governments was the "reduction of the isolation of
income groups within communities and geographical areas ...
through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for persons of lower income.
..."227 The HCD Act, according to Congress,
was also enacted to "further the development of a nationalpolicy" by
creating a system of federal aid which "encourages community development activities which are consistent with comprehensive local and
areawide development planning; further achievement of the national
housing goal. . .; and fosters the undertaking of housing and community development activities in a coordinated and mutually supportive
mannter."2

While expanding on its enunciated goals, Congress reiterated its
long-standing allegiance to the notion that local responsibility must be
222. Sub nom., City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976).
223. Apparently the panel's disposition is unreported.
224. 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1976).
225. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5301(a)(1) (1977).

226. Id. § 5301(b)(1).
227. Id § 5301(c)(6)(emphasis added).
228. Id § 5301(d)(2)-(4)(emphasis added).
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paramount for the implementation of the goals stated,2 29 but at the
same time restricted the federal capacity to implement the national
goals outlined. One of the reasons for the restrictions was an attempt
230
to reduce federal "red tape" by simplifying the funding procedures.

But in simplifying the procedures Congress reduced HUD's control by
providing for automatic approval of timely applications if not disapproved within seventy-five days of receipt,2 3 ' and specifying strict crite-

ria upon which any disapproval could be based.2 32 The inference is
fairly clear that these restrictions on HUD reflected as much Congressional frustration with HUD's administration of the housing laws as it

did any Congressional conception founded in housing and development policy. Probably consistently with Congressional intent,2 33 HUD

by regulation specified that the direct provision of housing-the funding of new construction or the provision of rent supplements and the

like-with community development block grant funds was ,prohibited.2 4
Nevertheless, in its application for community development block

grant funds, an applicant was required to submit a housing assistance
plan (HAP).23 5 In its HAP, in turn, an applicant, which could only be

a local government, was required to (1) accurately survey the condition
of housing and assess the housing needs of lower-income persons residing in or expected to reside in the applicant community, (2) specify a
realistic annual goal for the number of units to be assisted and (3) indicate the general locations of proposed housing in the applicant community for lower-income persons, with the objectives, inter alia, of
promoting greater choice of housing opportunities for low-income persons, and avoiding undue concentrations of assisted persons in areas
containing a high proportion of low-income persons.236
Funding for housing to be assisted would not come from the money
being applied for, but from other programs, under other statutes, utilizing different procedures. The major reliance to meet the housing
needs stated in the HAP probably was to be placed on a program en229. S. REP. No. 93-693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4324.
230. Id.; CONF. REP. No. 93-1279, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4449.

231. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5304() (1977).
232. Id. § 5304(c). (Application must be approved unless "plainly inconsistent" with "significant facts and data generally available," unless activities proposed are "plainly inappropriate" to
meeting specified needs, or unless it does not comply with some provision of the HCD Act or
proposes ineligible activities).
233. See id § 5305. (listing in considerable detail eligible activities but not listing new housing construction or cash assistance for housing).
234. 24 C.F.R. § 570.201(0 and (g) (1976).
235. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5304(a)(4) (1977).
236. Id.
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acted as part of the HCD Act, known as Section 8.237 There was, however, for the first time, in the HCD Act a direct linkage, though
somewhat tenuous, between federal community development assistance
and federal housing assistance, in that the HAP's would guide HUD in
funding most of the housing programs and, HUD was required to inform the local governments of applications for housing assistance funds
proposing housing in its locality.2 38
To recapitulate: Congress announced national goals and objectives
in the very vaguest of terms--the "reduction of isolation of income
groups", avoiding "undue" concentration of assisted persons, and "spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities." A nationalpolicy was
to be "furthered". Congress wanted to "foster" housing and development activities in a "mutually supportive manner." Simultaneously,
Congress reduced the federal capacity to effect its goals and objectives,
while purporting to increase the responsibility of local governments.
Congress required an application for community development funds
from a locality to specify a "realistic annual goal" of housing to be
assisted. HUD prohibited use of community development funds for
direct housing assistance. Moreover, local governments are not in the
business of supplying housing-a fact of which Congress presumably
was aware.
In the HCD Act Congress laid down mandates which are ambiguous, yet grandiose; which evidence a need for tighter federal control,
yet purport to enhance local authority and flexibility; and which set
national policy objectives, yet purport to restrict HUD's role and authority. Federal housing policy, therefore, attempts to go in two opposite directions simultaneously: toward nationally mandated objectives
andtoward greater local authority. At least as to the issue of suburban
exclusion these policies cannot co-exist. Congress simply cannot straddle these two horses because they do not run in the same direction.
This was the wonderful world of sad confusion that the Second Circuit was called upon to enter in the Hartford litigation. Treading into
that litigation the Court held that Hartford, its local officials, and lowincome persons living in the City of Hartford-in short, all the interests
and people who might have any real concern about HUD's enforcement of the HCD Act's requirements related to suburban exclusion--did not have standing to litigate whether HUD was violating the
HCD Act in a manner that destroyed the suburban inclusion objective!
The gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint was that HUD violated
the HCD Act in failing to disapprove applications from several subur237. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(Supp. 1977) enacted as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. II, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 662 (93d Cong. 2d Sess. 1974).
238. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1439 (Supp. 1977).
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ban towns in the Hartford metropolitan area. Plaintiffs relied on section 5304(a)(4)(A) 239 which states that no grant of community
development funds may be made unless the applicant "submits a housing assistance plan which. . . accurately surveys the condition of the
housing stock in the community and assesses the housing assistance
needs of lower income persons. . . residing in or expected to reside in
the community."' ° HUD determined to waive the requirement that
the applications of the suburban towns contain an assessment of the
needs of persons "expected to reside" (ETR) in the community for the
1975 funding year. Plaintiffs claimed that HUD had no authority to
make any such waiver.
In dismissing the complaint, five judges opined that the expected to
reside figure was to be "merely an educated guess", that "it became
clear that accurate predictions of the future would not be easy to
make", 24 ' and that even if higher ETR figures influenced HUD's allocation of housing assistance funds, no additional housing funds could
be obtained, because no additonal housing funds were available.24 2
They believed that for these reasons the absence of ETR figures likely
had no effect on the interests of the plaintiffs, 243 and that it was doubtful whether enjoining HUD from releasing the funds would redress
plaintiffs' alleged injury.244
The dissenters found that Hartford was an American central city
within the meaning of the HCD Act, and that as such, the Act, in general, was designed to assist Hartford, 245 that the significance of the requirement of ETR figures was in its "carrot and stick" approach to
meeting needs of persons of lower income, 2' that the absence of ETR
figures in the applications of the suburban towns "significantly reduced
the likelihood that any deconcentration beneficial to Hartford" would
occur, 2 4 7 and thus that preventing HUD's alleged violation of the HCD
Act would be of sufficient interest and benefit to Hartford to permit it
248
to challenge the violation.
Judge Kaufman, concurring to make a majority, lamented that the
laws the court was being called on to interpret, including the housing
laws at issue, could be compared to "King Minos's labyrinth in ancient
Crete" and he purportedly refused to intimate any view on "the general
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

42 U.S.C.A. § 5304(a)(4)(A) (1977).
561 F.2d at 1033, 1035.
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1055.
Id.at 1056.
Id. at 1057.
Id.at 1058.
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legislative pattern" of the HCD Act. 49 But he noted that the majority
characterized the ETR figures "as merely a small part of a very large
application," while the dissenters found the ETR figures to be "the
lynchpin of the statutory scheme, and the principal means by which the
legislative objective
of spatial deconcentration of low-income housing
250
may be achieved.
There is no suggestion that the district court judge and the ten judges
of the Court of Appeals are not in every way conscientious, sensible,
and reasonable people. Five of the judges came down squarely on one
side of the issue of the significance of an integral part of the national
housing legislation. Five came down squarely on the other. The eleventh judge made an unveiled indictment of Congress for failing to
make clear what the legislative command was on an issue as fundamental as the relevance of the national "Housing and Community Development Act of 1974" to so critical an issue as suburban inclusion.
Congress, not the courts, must bear the responsibility for what Judge
Oakes, in dissent, misapprehended as a situation in which the judicial
process went awry. Judge Oakes thought: "The anomalies in this case
might cause a lay observer to question the rationality of the judicial
process."'25' He was correct in his assessment of the ridiculousness of a
result in which, the only interests or persons directly affected by a clear
violation of one of the few clear legislative commands in the HCD Act
could not get into court to challenge that violation. He was clearly
wrong, however, to lay the fault with the judiciary. Congress, in the
contradictions, confusions, and complexities that it has enshrined as
"national housing policy"-which can only be so described in a euphemistic fit-invited the resulting mess. Congress can do better and
should.
II.

A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION: TOWARD EFFECTIVE DOCTRINE
AND ENFORCEMENT TOOLS

In the foregoing discussion, I have attempted to show the inadequacy
of both present constitutional and statutory doctrines, and the inadequacy of the tools for enforcing either a prohibition of exclusion or for
mandating inclusion. The present discussion is directed to identifying
the statutory provisions that would be necessary to correct the legislative inadequacies with respect to suburban exclusion/inclusion which
are found in both doctrine and remedies. In the appendix a proposed
statute is set forth as the legislative vehicle for correcting the inadequacies. An attempt will be made to identify the framework in which a
249. Id. at 1052.

250. Id.
251. Id. at 1054.
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statute such as the one proposed should be considered-the premises
and constraints affecting housing and development policies; and to outline specific problems to which provisions of the proposed statute are
addressed-the elements of an adequate statute and the rationale underlying particular elements.
A.

Premises and Constraints

Any statute dealing with suburban exclusion/inclusion issues, of
course, ought to be precisely drawn and should be facially as revealing
of Congressional purpose as words can possibly make it. But such a
statute, if it is to be effective, cannot be subordinated to either the tradition of local land use autonomy or the desire for unrestricted freedom
of individuals to associate. In recognition of the importance of these
interests they are subordinated only to the limited extent clearly necessary.
If the ending of suburban exclusion and the mandating of suburban
inclusion are to be made an enforcible and meaningful national housing policy, not merely those federal agencies dealing with housing, but
the entire federal apparatus ought to act to further that policy, at least
to the extent that the funds of every agency should be provided only
when they can be provided consistently with, and in furtherance of, the
national housing policies.2 52
To mandate a policy without providing tools to the agencies and
courts to effectuate that policy would be a hollow, perhaps a cruel, gesture. Accordingly, a statute, to be regarded as adequate, would have to
specify precisely what it was designed to do, provide clear commands
to agencies and courts, specify the standards by which to determine its
reach, and provide enforcement tools by which its purposes would most
likely be realized. The overriding problem to which the statute would
be addressed is governmental action in the land use area which excludes a disproportionate number of racial minorities and persons of
the lower economic classes from living within its boundaries. It is that
narrow problem the act should be designed to address.
The problem involves exclusion as a nationwide concept, but it appears that a prohibition in nationwide terms would be unworkable.
Criteria for determining whether exclusion has occurred must be referenced, therefore, to some practically workable geographic standard. In
an attempt to maximize housing locational choices but not dictate
them, the standard ought to be tied to general locational choices the
population has already expressed. Thus the geographic area in which
exclusion is measured should, on the one hand, be small enough to be
252. Cf. Proposal of Senator Proxmire as early as 1966, discussed in note 185 supra.
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workable and, on the other hand, large enought to effectuate the goal
of placing a meaningful prohibition on exclusion. The statute, therefore, would appropriately define the geographic area as the metropolitan area or housing market area, and the definition of these terms must
be workable. Workability would be enhanced if the geographic areas
would be those areas as to which data is most likely to be already generally available, areas which represent functional geographic units, and
areas which are tied to concepts employed by housing and planning
professionals.2 5 3
Finally to make a prohibition on exclusion something more than an
empty promise, the means must be made available for providing housing which would bring about an end to exclusion, and if, or when, local
governmental action fails to do that the national government must be
authorized to act to achieve the national policy. But in recognition of
deep rooted traditions of local autonomy in the land use area, the opportunity for local governments to act should be substantial. Only
when local governments clearly fail should the more intrusive options
be pursued. When events make it clear, however, that without direct
federal action the national policies will fail of achievement, the capacity of the federal government should equal the need for action.
B.

Elements of an Adequate Statute

1. The Policies of Prohibiting Exclusion and Mandating Inclusion
The first problem is to define the problem addressed. That problem
is exclusionary land use practices. But what is a land use practice?
And when is it exclusionary? A narrow definition of land use practice
would invite artful or devious devices to avoid the statute. The proposed statute would prevent evasive strategies by laying down an encompassing definition of "land use practice. ' 254 Its definition includes
any "restrictions, regulations or controls" on the usage of real property,
and goes on to specify several examples. Then it contains an inclusive
phrase "any and all qualitatively similar" kinds of local conduct.
Secondly, "land use practice" should be defined to include any conduct "directly related" to any restriction, regulation, or control on the
usage of real property. The definition then lists several specific examples such as limitations on residential construction, limitations on sewer
hookups, and concludes with a catchall phrase covering "qualitatively
similar" conduct. 2"
253. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) for a discussion of these geographic concepts.
254. Proposed "One America Act," Appendix § 3(a)(i) [Hereinafter Appendix].
255. Appendix § 3(a)(ii).
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The definition should be broad enough to make clear that evasive
conduct will prove unsuccessful. Where evasive conduct takes place,
courts will not have to hesitate while guessing at the application of the
statute. Accordingly the impulses to adopt evasive devices, as well as
the delays incident to extensive litigation, would be minimized under
the proposed statute.
The next step is to define land use practices which constitute the evil
to which the statute is directed. The evil is an "exclusionary" land use
practice. Such a practice should be defined as any practice which results in or causes the exclusion of a "disproportionate number of persons of any racial group, ethnic group of any national origin, or income
group from residing within the geographic or political jurisdiction of
the local governmental body" engaging in the land use practice.2 56
The proposed definition has four features. First, it is limited to the
narrow problem of the exclusion, by land use practices, along racial or
economic lines. An argument can be made for addressing age, sex,
religion, household status (e.g. unmarried female-headed households)
and the like. However, in my judgment, exclusionary zoning on the
basis of these characteristics does not, at the present time, implicate the
serious national concerns of racial and economic exclusion.
Second, the definition is designed to cover instances in which a governmental body's capacity to engage in a land use practice extends beyond its geographic jurisdiction, such as in an extra-territorial planning
district. Thus the act would include not merely a local government's
geographic jurisdiction, but also its "political" jurisdiction. 5 7
Third, the definition contains a provision which effects a "fair share"
analysis for determining whether a land use practice is exclusionary. It
accomplishes this by defining an "exclusionary land practice" as one
which excludes a "disproportionate number" of persons of a racial or
income group. In turn, it defines "disproportionate" and "number of
persons" on the basis of comparing the ratios of the proportions of persons residing within the governmental body's jurisdiction and the persons residing in the larger geographic area that includes the
governmental body.25
256. Appendix § 3(b). Compare H.R. 3504,95th Cong., 1st Sess. This is a bill introduced on
February 16, 1977 by Representatives Edwards and Drinan. Section 206(g) of H.R. 3504 would
amend the 1968 Civil Right Act by adding to § 804, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604 (1977), a subsection (g)
which would make unlawful the exercise of any governmental powers with respect to "planning,
zoning, subdivision controls, building codes or permits or other matters affecting land use or development, to exclude low- or moderate-income housing because of the eligibility of such housing
for governmental assistance, or because of the race, color, national origin, or economic status of
the prospective occupants of such housing."
257. Appendix § 3(bXi).
258. Appendix §§ 3(b)(ii) and (iii).
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Fourth, it sets up a presumption of an exclusionary practice, if the
ratio of the number of minorities or low-income persons residing in the
governmental body is below by fifty percent the ratio of minorities or
low-income persons in the larger geographic area of which the governmental body is a part.25 9
The prohibition on exclusionary land use practices should be strong
and extensive.2 60 To avoid any problem of interpreting the extent to
which the act is designed to reach such practices, the proposed act
makes clear that all the power Congress possesses under the Constitution is exercised. The sole issue of determining the extent of the prohibition which could ever be raised would be whether under any
provision of the Constitution Congress has the power to act. If it possesses the power to prohibit the exclusionary practice in question in any
case, the act would make clear that it is prohibited.
The proposed statute would prohibit acts which have "the effect" of
excluding persons by defining as exclusionary an act which "results in,
or causes" exclusion.2 6 ' Any requirement that a showing be made of a
"purpose or intent" to discriminate or exclude a class or persons in a
class would be unworkable and unrealistic. It would be unworkable in
the sense that proving purpose or intent is so difficult that a large portion of instances in which such exclusion in fact takes place would be
unprovable and thus would admit of no remedy. It would be unrealistic in the sense that the purpose or intent with which exclusionary conduct takes place is irrelevant to the question of whether there is
exclusion. For purposes of the statute, conduct which may not be motivated by an exclusionary intent, if it is effective at excluding, would
constitute the evil. Conversely, conduct wholly ineffective at achieving
exclusion need not be proscribed by the statute for the simple reason
that bad motivation to engage in conduct would injure no one if the
motivation produced no exclusionary act in fact.
As an overall matter, a standard that would necessitate looking for
purpose or intent would simply encourage, indeed invite, artful devices
to conceal it. A search for intent in this area would involve courts in
the morass of separating out good motive from bad motive, when indeed motive is irrelevant to the purposes of a statute mandating an
inclusionary society.
Consistently with its objective of making the least intrusion upon private individual rights of association, the act would be addressed to governmental, not private, conduct.2 62 It would, however, reach devices
259.
260.
261.
262.

Appendix § 3(b)(iii). See also Appendix § 3(b)(iv).
Appendix § 4.
Appendix § 3(b)(i).
Read Appendix § 3(b)(i) with Appendix § 4.
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by which private persons or entities undertake functions which would
be traditionally carried out by governmental bodies. In conjunction
with the proposed statute's concern with land use practices, however, it
would not reach even private entities which carried out traditional governmental functions which are not included in the definition of "land
use practice." For example, the operation of schools, operation of fire
departments and the collection of garbage might be regarded as functions traditionally carried out by governmental bodies. If undertaken
by private entities such activities would cause private entities to fall
within the definition of "governmental body." Falling within the definition of "governmental body," however, would not be within the statute's coverage unless the governmental body also engaged in a "land
use practice." This is so because the definition of land use practice
does not include operation of a school, fire department or garbage collection services." 3
Conversely, if a private entity determined dwelling square footage
requirements or issued building permits it should be covered because it
would be performing a function traditionally regarded as governmental
and one that is included in the definition of land use practice. Thus,
divestiture of land use functions by a governmental body and transferrance of the power, for example, to an association of homeowners or a
private club should not take the activity out of the act's coverage. Similarly, the creation by the state of special sewerage treatment districts
should not take such districts out of the act's coverage since the provision of sewerage services is traditionally a governmental function and
would be defined as a land use practice under the act.
In this connection attention should be called to those provisions of
the proposed act requiring a "land use practice".2 " The basic prohibition speaks of a "land use practice" and other provisions apply only to
governmental bodies which "engage in" a land use practice.26 5
While the prohibition on exclusionary land use practices might be
absolute, the ultimate sanction probably should not be absolute. The
difficulty inheres in the impracticability of devising a sanction which is
absolute, and of devising a reasonable means for enforcing any such
sanction, short of calling up federal troops, which would probably create a situation worse than the problem of exclusionary zoning. Moreover, the specter of "forced housing," as the shibboleth goes, is
probably not worth fueling anymore than is minimally required to effect the purposes of the statute. The premise of the administrative enforcement provision on non-exclusionary land use practices in the
263. Appendix § 3(a)(i) and (ii).
264. Appendix § 4.
265. Appendix §§ 3(b)(i), 5, 6(b), and 7(b).
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proposed act 266 is that in the vast majority of instances federal funding
would constitute a sufficient "carrot" that using the "stick" would not
be necessary. At a minimum, since federal funds are pervasive in the
lives of governmental bodies, the potential loss of such funds would
spur a wide measure of desirable conduct.
Fundamentally, the point is that the federal government should not
provide funding to a governmental body that takes actions which undermine an objective--non-exclusionary housing-which is perhaps
the lynchpin of school desegregation, improved job opportunities and
an improved living environment for black and lower economic families. All federal funds should, at a minimum, be conditioned on the
governmental recipient's forebearance of any conduct which is at odds
with so basic a policy. Accordingly, all federal funds should be conditioned on the effectuation of that basic policy. 267 Indeed, apart from
national defense concerns, it is difficult to see that there is any policy
the federal government can undertake which is not related to the
achievement of the goal articulated as "a decent home in a suitable
living environment." To the extent that the goal is unrealized all other
domestic policies cannot produce maximum benefit.
A prohibition of exclusionary land use practices would not necessarily result in making housing available, nor in correcting the continuing
effects of prior exclusionary practices. But, since local governmental
bodies are rarely involved in the direct provision of housing, the most
that can be required of them is that268in their land use plans they make
provision for inclusionary housing.
The absence of inclusionary housing appears to result from two separate phenomena. One is that local governments engage in land use
actions which exclude persons who have the financial resources to demand housing in the private housing market. A prohibition of the exclusion, if effective, would be beneficial to upper income persons
excluded. If the governmental body did not cease its exclusion, provide remedies for any continuing effects of the prior exclusion, and
adopt a plan for including the fair share of excluded persons within its
jurisdiction it would be ineligible to receive any federal funds.26 9
With respect to those persons who could not demand housing on the
private market without financial assistance, the prohibition would be of
no benefit. If that were the end of the act, it likely would fall far, far
short of its purpose. To prevent that, and to effect inclusionary objectives in instances where inclusion is not likely to occur without housing
266.
267.
268.
269.

Appendix
Appendix
Appendix
Appendix

§
§
§
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5.
5(a).
5(c)(ii).
5(c).
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assistance of some kind, the act should make the federal government
the "houser of last resort. ' 270 As such the federal government would
make funds available to meet the housing assistance needs of persons
with lower-incomes.2 7 '
The funds would be made available for housing assistance within the
area of jurisdiction of the governmental body. 72 At that juncture, in
an attempt to maximize the land use prerogatives of local government
consistently with the purpose of the act, the local governmental body
should be given ample opportunity to employ the funds in any way it
saw fit to meet the needs of the lower income persons.2 73 However, if
it failed to do so after a reasonable interval, the federal government
should be empowered to make the housing available, consistently with
sound planning concepts, but without regard to the local land use practices of the governmental body.27 4
2.

The Tools of Policy Enforcement

Perhaps it is in the area of enforcement mechanisms that present
doctrines and legislation are most seriously deficient. The proposed
act would go a long way toward remedying those deficiencies.
In the administration of its provisions relating to federal financial
assistance, the proposed act would lodge a power to determine the eligibility of a governmental body for federal funds in the Secretary of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development.27 5 It would lay precise criteria by which the determination would be made. Generally
speaking, all local governments are engaged in some kind of land use
practice, as that term would be defined in the proposed act. The key
provision would require a presumption that a land use practice resulted
in exclusion if the ratio of the proportion of minorities and low-income
persons residing in the jurisdiction of a governmental body is fifty percent, or more, lower than the ratio of the proportion of that group in
the metropolitan or housing market area within which the local government is located.2 76 In cases where the proportion is only ten percent or
less below the larger area's a determination of ineligibility would not be
made.27 7 In cases where the proportion falls between forty-nine and
eleven percent below the larger area's proportion the Secretary would
270. Appendix § 8. CONF. REP. No. 93-1279, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4499.
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272.
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be required to consider all factors bearing on the exclusion issue
known, as well as the ratio of proportions and the effects and tendencies'of any land use practices. 78
Following a determination of ineligibility, the governmental body
could become eligible by showing that it made provision for a reasonable proportion of housing for minorities and low-income persons,2 7 9
that the state had prohibited exclusionary land use practices, or2 8 0 that
it had ceased its exclusionary housing practices and taken effective
ameliorative steps.28 '
The proposed provisions would encourage states to exercise greater
control over their political jurisdictions, since enactment of an adequate state statute would make every governmental body in the state
eligible for federal financial assistance. Similarly, a finding of eligibility would not preclude future federal financial assistance if adequate
correctional measures were taken by the local government. This
would, therefore, encourage local governments to correct their practices. Finally, the proposed statute, by laying down clear criteria for
determining eligibility, would put local governments on notice of what
is required and avoid as far as practicable the risks of differential treatment, or arbitrary determinations by the Secretary. At the same time,
a clear statement of the Act's inclusionary thrust would be made, thus
avoiding the need for a large bureaucracy to make the eligibility decision. 282

A comprehensive act should also be enforcible at the instance of private persons or governmental entities that are affected by any violation
of act. The provisions on private enforcement, to avoid severe inadequacies in present doctrines and legislation, should specify who can
sue, as well as the standard for determining whether exclusion had
taken place. Key provisions of the proposed act address these
problems.
The proposed act would permit any person, as well as any governmental body in which reside a disporportionate number of persons of
any identifiable group or class, to sue in the United States District
Courts without meeting any jurisdictional limit based on the amount in
controversy. 2 8 3 However, suit could be brought against another local
governmental body only if that body were located in the same metropolitan or housing market area as the plaintiff. Since the standard for
determining whether exclusion has occurred is referenced to functional
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
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geographic units, suits against local governments should be similarly
limited.
As to whether exclusion has taken place, the proposed act would provide that a prima facie case may be made by (1) a statistical showing
that minorities or low-income persons are under-represented in the jurisdiction of a governmental body engaging in a land use practice 284 or
that the land use practice had exclusionary tendencies or effects.2 85
After a prima facie showing, the act would shift the burden of proof to
the governmental body to rebut the prima facie case. 286 Rebuttal
could be shown on the same grounds an administrative rebuttal could
be made 287 as well as one additional ground. The additional ground
would permit rebuttal upon a showing that the land use practice had no
effect and no tendency to exclude any specified group or class.2 88
The last rebuttal ground would be included in the private action section but not the administrative conditioning section, based on two considerations. In using national funds the government may set
requirements and conditions which tend to effectuate national policies.
Short of constitutional invalidity, the standards by which the national
government judges whether national policies are being effected may be
as strict as desirable, since the government is not required to make
funds available to local governments unless those governments clearly
pursue national objectives. The second consideration is that apart
from the inducement to achieve inclusion which conditioning funds
would create, the act would be directed to prohibiting exclusion, but
not to mandating inclusion. Accordingly, in private actions in courts
the issue will be whether local land use practices are exclusionary. By
hypothesis such practices could not be regarded as exclusionary if they
could be shown to have no effect on exclusion and no tendency to exclude. At bottom, these provisions would be based on a judgment that
as a matter of national policy a local government should not be required to do more than avoid exclusionary practices if it is willing to
forego all federal financial assistance. But note that it might not be
able to avoid all federally assisted housing, if it were part of a metropolitan area or housing market area in which a need for housing assistance existed.2 89 On the other hand, if a local government could prove
that it did not exclude it would not be liable under the private remedies
provisions of the proposed act. And if it did not receive any federal
funds and was not in a metropolitan area or housing market area in
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
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which persons needed housing assistance it would have no inclusionary
duties under the act.
Upon failure of a local government to rebut a prima facie case of
exclusion in a private action, the court would grant any effective remedy within its statutory or equitable power 2 90 to end the exclusion and
to ameliorate its effects.29 1
Finally, standing under the act would be expanded to the minimum
required by the Article III limitation of jurisdiction to "cases" and
"controversies," and the "injury in fact" and "benefits" test gloss on the
standing question 292 would be specified as any "injury" which is not
''completely conjectural" and any "benefit" which is not "completely
speculative. ' 293 The intent of those provisions would be to avoid the
closing of the courthouse doors except when the person suing had no
interest to be protected under the act and would derive no benefit from
a successful suit.
Since the issues would be narrowed and the determination of those
issues would be made under criteria specified under the act, it would
seem proper to permit a wide range of potential plaintiffs to seek to
enforce the national policies of the act. The reason courts restrict
standing seems at least in part to be to avoid getting into open-ended
law suits with unclear or indeterminable decisonal benchmarks. The
act would avoid any need to be concerned about such possibilities.
III.

POSTSCRIPT

If enacted the proposed statute, of course, would not cure all the ills
affecting America. Recognizing the nature of the political process and
understanding the nature of the congressional legislative process, I understand fully that the statute, as proposed, most likely could not be
enacted in the current times. Nevertheless, it does, in the context of
the discussion that preceded it, point up the dimensions of the solution
needed in light of the magnitude of the problems the nation faces.
Legislative action such as the statute proposed, if combined with
thrusts to revitalize America's central cities, would provide the vehicle
for America to seize the opportunity to become, indeed, one nation.
That opportunity may not exist much longer. The only thing that
would make so bold an effort worth undertaking is the extremely high
stake each of us has in the unfinished evolution of America from a
society that has held out the promise of being just and decent to a society that keeps that promise.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See Appendix § 4.
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APPENDIX

The One America Act
Section 1. Findings [omitted]
Section 2. " Purposes [omitted]
Section 3. Definitions(a) Land use practice"Land use practice" includes(i) any and all restrictions, regulations, or controls on the usage
of real property, for residential purposes, including zoning, lot size
requirements, dwelling square footage requirements, set-back requirements, density requirements, platting, land use plans, water
shed regulations, subdivision regulations, flood plain regulations,
comprehensive plans, official maps, and any qualitively similar acts,
rules, regulations, laws, ordinances, programs, plans, or practices,
and
(ii) any and all acts, rules, regulations, laws, ordinances, programs, plans, practices, or activities directly related to any land use
restriction, regulation, or control on the usage of real property, for
residential purposes, including any referendum requirement, limitation on residential construction, limitation on the issuance of building permits, limitation on sewer or water hookups, limitation on the
provision of any service furnished by a governmental body or with
the permission of a governmental body, or furnished within the jurisdiction of a governmental body by or with the permission of another governmental body or a state, the conditioning of any
permission to build any dwelling unit upon the availability of any
service furnished by or with the permission of a governmental body,
by or with the permission of another governmental body or a state,
or by the builder of any dwelling unit, and any qualitively similar
act, rule, regulation, law, ordinance, program, plan, practice, or activity.
(b) Exclusionary land use practice-(i) An "exclusionary land use practice" is any land use practice
of a governmental body which results in, or causes, the exclusion of
a disproportionate number of persons of any racial group, ethnic
group, group of any national origin, or income group from residing
within the geographic or political jurisdiction of that governmental
body.
(ii) The "number of persons" of any race, ethnic group, national
origin, or income group shall be determined by comparing the ratios
of (A) the number of persons of that race, ethnic group, national
origin, or income group and the total number of persons residing in
the metropolitan area or housing market area, as applicable, with (B)
the number of persons of that race, ethnic group, national origin, or
income group and the total number of persons residing within the
geographic or political jurisdiction of a governmental body.
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(iii) A "disproportionate number of persons" shall be deemed to
have been excluded by any land use practice when the ratio of the
number of persons of any race, ethnic group, national origin, or income group residing within the geographic or political jurisdiction of
a governmental body is below, by fifty percentum (50%), or more,:
the ratio of such persons residing in the metropolitan area or housing
market area, as applicable, in which that governmental body is included.
(iv) A "proportionate number of persons" shall be deemed to exist when the ratio of the number of persons of any race, ethnic group,
national origin, or income group residing within the geographic or
political jurisdiction of a governmental body or the number of
dwelling units available for occupancy by such persons equals or is
within ten percentum (10%) of equaling the ratio of such persons
residing in the metropolitan area of housing market area, as applicable, in which that governmental body is included.
(v) "Income group" means persons whose individual income, or
who are members of a household whose income, places a person or
household within either that group of persons whose income equals
or is below the poverty line established by the United States government, or that group of persons whose income equals or is less than
eighty percentum (80%) of the median income for the metropolitan
area, or housing market area, as applicable, in which that person, or
the household of which that person is a member, resides.
(c) Inclusionary land use planAn "inclusionary land use plan" is a plan submitted by a governmental body to, and approved by, the Secretary.
(d) Federal financial assistance"Federal financial assistance" means any monetary assistance
provided by the United States government or any agency thereof to
a governmental body for any governmental activity, plan, or program including all grants, loans, contracts of insurance or guaranty,
matching grants, or funding of any kind for any governmental purpose or for any proprietary purpose carried out by a governmental
body.
(e) Governmental body"Governmental body" means the District of Columbia, any political subdivision of any state, and any entity which is a public body
corporate and politic authorized by a state to exist or created by a
state, and any entity which carries out functions traditionally carried
out by public bodies.
(f) Metropolitan areaA "metropolitan area" is any area defined as a standard metropolitan statistical area by the Office of Management and Budget, and
any other urbanized area not included within a standard metropolitan statistical area, which is determined by the Secretary to be a metropolitan area.
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(g) Housing market areaA "housing market area" is any geographic area not within a metropolitan area, in which comparable housing units are in competition based on working, commuting and residential patterns, and any
area within which residences and jobs are customarily regarded as
within commuting distances from home to work, as shall be determined by the Secretary.
(h) SecretaryThe "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
(i) Assisted housing unit"Assisted housing unit" means any dwelling unit for which federal
assistance is provided in whole or in part, or any person determined
to be eligible for assistance for housing purposes, under any program
of the federal government.
Section 4. Exclusionary land usepracticesprohibied- All exclusionary land
use practices are prohibited to the maximum extent Congress has the power
to do so under any provision, clause, or amendment of the Constitution.
Section 5. Federalfinancial assistanceprohibited- (a) No governmental
body that is engaged in any land use practice which receives federal financial assistance shall engage in any exclusionary land use practice.
(b) Every agency of the United States government is prohibited from
granting any federal financial assistance directly or through any state to a
governmental body which engages in any exclusionary land use practice, or
to any governmental body which is in whole or in part subject to the jurisdiction of any other governmental body or a state which engages in any
exclusionary land use practice within the geographic jurisdiction of the governmental body which would be granted federal financial assistance, except
as authorized in subsection (c) of this section.
(c) No agency of the United States government may provide federal financial assistance to any governmental body which on August 22, 1974 was
engaged in any exclusionary land use practice, or which at any time after
the effective date of this act has engaged in any exclusionary land use practice, unless
(i) the governmental body which would be granted federal financial
assistance is located within a state which by statute prohibits exclusionary
land use practices within that state in terms substantively identical to the
terms of this act and which statute provides remedies to exclusionary land
use practices substantively and procedurally identical to those specified in
section 7 of this act, or
(ii) the governmental body which is to receive federal financial assistance
(A) has ceased to engage in any exclusionary land use practice, or in the
case of another governmental body or a state, such other governmental body or state, has ceased to engage in any exclusionary land
use practice within the geographic jurisdiction of the governmental
body which would be granted federal financial assistance,
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has undertaken to remove any continuing effects on any person of
the exclusionary land use practice, and
(C) has submitted an inclusionary land use plan which plan has been
approved by the Secretary.
(B)

Section 6.

Administrative provisions- (a)

Certifying eligibility for federal

financial assistanceThe Secretary shall be responsible for certifying, for purposes of Section 5
of this act, whether a governmental body is eligible to receive federal financial assistance, and upon request of any agency of the United States government, shall certify whether the governmental body is eligible to receive
federal financial assistance, and such certification shall be binding on the
requesting agency.
(b) Presumptions and method for certifying eligibilityFor the purpose of making the certification of eligibility under this act
(i) in the case of a governmental body which is engaged, or on or after
August 22, 1974 has engaged, in any land use practice, or of a governmental
body which is in whole or in part subject to the jurisdiction of any other
governmental body or a state which, within the geographic jurisdiction of
the governmental body, has engaged in a land use practice, the Secretary
shall presume that the governmental body has engaged in an exclusionary
land use practice when a disproportionate number of persons would be
deemed to have been excluded under section 3(b)(iii) based on the most
recent data available to the Secretary at the time the certification is made,
or,
(ii) in the case of a governmental body which has not engaged in a land
use practice at any time specified under subsection (b)(i) of this section, or
in the case of a governmental body from which a disproportionate number
of persons would not be deemed to have been excluded under section
3(b)(iii), but within which a proportionate number of persons under section
3(b)(iv) does not reside, the Secretary shall make the certification based on
the most recent data available to the Secretary at the time the certification is
made,provided,that the Secretary shall consider the ratio of the proportions
determined under section3(b)(iii) and shall evaluate any exclusionary effects
of any land use practice engaged in at any time, the continuing effects of
such land use practice, any exclusionary tendencies of such land use practice, as well as any other relevant factors of which the Secretary has knowledge.
(c) Rebutting a determination of ineligibilityAny governmental body determined to be ineligible may rebut such finding by
(i) meeting the provisions of section 5(c) of this act, or
(ii) presenting evidence satisfactory to the Secretary that neither it has
engaged in any exclusionary land use practice, nor has any governmental
body or state engaged in any exclusionary land use practice within its geographic jurisdiction in that in engaging in any land use practice, provision
was made for the number of housing units which would be occupied by a
proportionate number of persons within its geographic jurisdiction.
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(d) Elements of an inclusionary land use planThe Secretary shall not approve any land use plan as an inclusionary land
use plan unless the plan makes provisions for the numbers of housing units
which would be occupied by a proportionate number of persons.
Section 7. Remedialprovisions- (a) Private actions authorizedAny person who is a member of a group or class specified in Section
3(b)(i) of this act, and any governmental body within the political or geographic jurisdiction of which reside a number of persons which exceeds a
proportionate number of persons by ten percentum (10%) or more, may sue
any other person, any governmental body or any agency of the United
States government, to enforce any provision of this act in the United States
District Court, without regard to the amount in controversy, provided
(i) that in the case of suit brought against a governmental body, suit
may be brought only if the person or governmental body bringing the suit
resides or is located within the same metropolitan area or housing market
area, as applicable, as the governmental body being sued, and (ii) that in the
case of suit brought against a person as an official of a governmental body,
suit may be brought only if the person or governmental body bringing the
suit resides or is located within the same metropolitan area or housing market area, as applicable, as the governmental body of which the person being
sued is an official.
(b) Prima facie evidence of exclusionary land use practiceA prima facie case of an exclusionary land use practice may be made
against a governmental body upon proof
(i) that a disproportionate number of persons would be deemed to have
been excluded under section 3(b)(iii) of this act, or
(ii) that any land use practice engaged in by, or within the geographic
jurisdiction of, a governmental body had either an exclusionary effect, or a
natural tendency to exclude any person who is a member of a group specified in section 3(b)(i).
(c) Rebutting a prima facie caseA prima facie case of an exclusionary land use practice may be rebutted
only by a showing by a preponderance of the evidence, with the burden of
proof being on the governmental body against which a prima facie case is
made, that
(i) the governmental body clearly satisfies the provisions of section 5(c),
or section 6(c)(ii) of this act, or
(ii) the land use practice of the governmental body clearly had no effect
of excluding, and clearly has no tendency, direct or indirect, to exclude, any
person specified in section 3(b)(i) of this act.
(d) Secretary may be made a partyThe Secretary may be made a party
(i) to any action in which there is drawn into question the Secretary's
compliance with any provision of this act, or
(ii) to any action not specified in subsection (i) of this section in which
there is drawn into question any provision of this act, and if made a party,
the Secretary shall provide to the court and to the other parties to the action

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1977

63

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1977], Art. 4

100

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

any relevant information the Secretary may have regarding any issue raised
under this act.
(e) StandingIn any action in which there exists a case or controversy under Article III
of the Constitution, any person who suffers injury directly or indirectly so
long as the injury is not completely conjectural, or who would benefit directly or indirectly so long as the benefit is not completely speculative, shall
have standing to sue to determine whether any governmental body is eligible to receive federal financial assistance, whether the Secretary is complying with any provision of this act, or to determine whether any provision of
this act is being violated.
(f) Judicial remediesUpon a determination that any provision of this act has been violated the
court shall grant that remedy, so long as the remedy is within its statutory
power under this act or its general equitable power, which will most effectively result in enforcing the provisions of this act.
Section 8.

Federalgovernment as houser of last resort- (a)

Houser of last

resortTo the extent of authorizations and appropriations, the federal government, acting through the Secretary, shall be the houser of last resort, and
shall make available housing for any person who does not live in a decent
home in a suitable living environment, as determined by the Secretary.
(b) Studies and reportsThe Secretary shall make appropriate studies to determine, under criteria
to be developed by the Secretary, the extent to which any person does not
live in a decent home in a suitable living environment, and shall, at least
annually, issue a report, on a state-by-state basis, to the President and the
Congress, which contains the results and findings of such studies, which report shall contain an evaluation of the extent to which any person is not
living in a decent home in a suitable environment by reason of
(i) any exclusionary land use practice,
(ii) the unavailability of sufficient authorizations or appropriations by
the Congress,
(iii) any recission, impoundment or refusal to authorize the spending of
funds appropriated by the Congress, and
(iv) any inadequacy in any legislation passed by Congress which would
further the ends of this act.
(c) Studies of and funding to meet housing assistance needs(i) The Secretary shall make appropriate studies to determine, under
criteria to be developed by the Secretary, the housing assistance needs of
any person specified in Section 3(b) in each metropolitan area or housing
market area, as applicable.
(ii) Based upon the studies required under subsection (i) of this section,
but not later than eighteen (18) months after the effective date of this act,
the Secretary shall notify every Governmental body that engages in a land
use practice within the metropolitan area or housing market area, as applicable, to which the study relates of
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(A)

the housing assistance needs of any person specified in section 3(b)
of this act who resides within that metropolitan area or housing
market area, as applicable, and the number of assisted housing units
needed,
(B) the number of assisted housing units available to any person specified in section 3(b) which are needed in the political or geographic
jurisdiction of the governmental body to which the notice is sent to
bring the number of units occupied by such persons up to an
amount which equals the proportion of such persons who reside in
the metropolitan area or housing market area, as applicable, to
which the study relates.
(iii) Any governmental body notified under subsection (c)(ii) of this section, if the number of units stated under subsection (c)(ii)(B) of this section
is more than two percentum (2%) of the existing housing units within the
political or geographic jurisdiction of that governmental body, shall be notified that it has ninety (90) days to prepare an inclusionary land use plan,
except that in the Secretary's discretion the period may be extended for an
additional period not to exceed ninety (90) days.
(iv) Upon receipt and approval of an inclusionary land use plan under
subsection (c)(iii) of this section, the secretary shall, to the extent of funds
authorized and appropriated for housing assistance under any federal housing program, make available, for the area within the political or geographic
jurisdiction of the governmental body submitting the plan, funds for housing assistance sufficient to assist the number of housing units determined
under subsection (c)(ii)(B) of this section.
(v) After an interval of at least twelve (12), but not more than eighteen
(18) months, the Secretary shall ascertain whether the housing units for
which funds were made available under subsection (c)(iv) are occupied or
available for occupancy, or subject to construction contracts, and
(A) if such housing units are not occupied or available for occupancy,
but are subject to construction contracts, the Secretary may extend
the period for making units available for occupancy for a period not
to exceed six (6) months beyond eighteen (18) months from the date
housing assistance funds were made available, or
(B) if such housing units are not occupied, available for occupancy or
subject to construction contracts, within twenty-four (24) months
from the date housing assistance funds were made available the Secretary shall notify the governmental body for which funds for housing assistance were made available that the Secretary may take such
action as is authorized under subsection (c)(vi) of this section.
(vi) In the case of a governmental body which fails to submit an inclusionary land use plan under subsection (c)(iii) of this section, after notice
under subsection (c)(ii), or in the case of any governmental body notified
under subsection (c)(v)(B), the Secretary may take such action as is necessary and appropriate to make the housing units available which were determined under subsection (c)(ii) of this section.
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(vii) In making units available under subsection (c)(vi) of this section,
the Secretary may consider any reasons justifying a failure to submit an
inclusionary land use plan or the delay on the part of the governmental
body in making housing units available and if the circumstances, as determined by the Secretary, warrant, may provide a further period to the governmental body to make the housing units available, but such additional
period shall not extend beyond thirty (30) months from the date funds were
first made available under subsection (c)(iv); and in any event at the expiration of a period of thirty six (36) months, the Secretary shall take such action
as is necessary and appropriate to make housing available under subsection
(c)(vi); and in so doing may disregard any land use practice of any governmental body, provided that the Secretary's actions shall not be inconsistent
with sound housing planning; and providedfurther that any governmental
service shall be extended to housing made available by the Secretary on the
exact terms and conditions that such service is made available by the governmental body to other residential users.
Section 9. The Secretary is authorized to issue rules and
regulations-The Secretary is authorized to issue rules and regulations,
not inconsistent with this act, which are reasonable and necessary to
accomplish the purposes of this act.
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